A PRINCIPLED STATUTORY APPROACH TO
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
RICHARD D. FREER*

"Supplemental jurisdiction" is a generic term encompassing the concepts of ancillary and pendentjurisdiction.' In either form, supplemental
jurisdiction permits the efficient packaging of litigation in federal court 2
by allowing joinder of claims over which there is no independent basis of
jurisdiction.3 Despite its usefulness, the doctrine has had a checkered
career, richly earning its nickname "child of necessity and sire of
confusion."

4

The principal source of confusion is the Supreme Court's consistent
failure to discern and discuss in a principled fashion the statutory authorization for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Article EI requires
that Congress prescribe the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. With
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who participated in hours of debate and discussion that forged and clarified many of the ideas in this
article. Sara Beth Brody, Emory Law School Class of 1987, provided valuable research assistance.
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1. A considerable body of recent literature suggests that there is no meaningful distinction
between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. This literature calls for an inclusive doctrine outlining
federal court jurisdiction over claims that fail to satisfy statutory bases for original federal subject
matterjurisdiction. See, ag., Matasar, A PendentandAncillary JurisdictionPrimer The Scope and
Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C DAVIS L. REV. 103, 150-57 (1983); Note, A Closer
Look atPendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of IncidentalJurisdiction, 95 HARv.
L. REV. 1935, 1937 (1982); Comment, Pendentand Ancillary J7urisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of
Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, 1271-87 (1975). Although the Supreme Court has recognized the similarity between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, it has refused to decide whether they
constitute a single doctrine. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 n.8
(1978) (recognizing that ancillary and pendent jurisdiction stem from the same problem); Aldinger
v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (finding "little profit in attempting to decide whether... there are
any 'principled' differences" between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction). Under the traditional
view, pendent jurisdiction is exercised over nonfederal claims asserted by a plaintiff as part of a
federal question suit. Ancillary jurisdiction involves claim or party joinder instituted by a party or
nonparty. See L FRiEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.14, at 77-78
(1985); Matasar, supra, at 117-18.
2. The trend toward inclusive packaging of disputes is well documented. See, ag., Freer,
Rethinking Compulsory Joinder. A Proposalto Restructure FederalRule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1061, 1061-73 (1985); Matasar, supra note I, at 106-18; McCoid, A Single Packagefor Multiparty
DIsputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1976).
3. Throughout this article, 'Jurisdiction" refers to subject matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction is assumed.
4. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and Joinderof Claims, 33 F.R.D. 27, 45 (1963).
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regard to the original jurisdiction of these courts, the Supreme Court has
done two things. First, it has expressed great concern with the scope of
the congressional grants, specifically undertaking the task of construing
the statutory language. Second, it has construed those grants far more
narrowly than the Constitution or the language of the statutes would
require. This caution and circumspection bespeak concerns regarding
federalism and respect for the limited nature of federal jurisdiction.
The Court has treated supplemental jurisdiction in a wholly different fashion. For over a century, it recognized and greatly expanded the
scope of supplemental jurisdiction without a single mention of statutory
authorization. In stark contrast to its treatment of original jurisdiction,
the Court has been anything but cautious or restrictive. It has boldly
asserted supplemental jurisdiction to the full constitutional limit, asserting power over all claims that have a sufficient transactional relationship
to be included in a single "case or controversy."
The judiciary's consistent failure to so much as mention statutory
authorization, much less acknowledge the need for it, has led many to
conclude that supplemental jurisdiction is a form of common law subject
matter jurisdiction.5 But in view of the requirements of Article III, that
term is an oxymoron. Unless the judiciary has unconstitutionally
usurped legislative power for a century, there must be some statutory
basis for supplemental jurisdiction.
In the mid-1970's, the Court finally addressed the issue of congressional authorization of supplemental jurisdiction. But neither Aldinger v.
Howard 6 nor Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger 7 established a
principled, comprehensive approach. Instead, the Court in each case
looked for evidence of specific congressional intent to preclude the use of
supplemental jurisdiction under the specific circumstances presented.
This approach is fundamentally flawed. The search for congressional
preclusion of jurisdiction assumes that Congress had previously granted
authority over supplemental claims. Yet the Court never identified the
source of that grant, and thus failed to establish a statutory basis for the
principled resolution of supplemental jurisdiction questions. In short,
the Court sanctioned an ad hoc search for legislative intent despite the
rather obvious fact that Congress, in passing the general jurisdictional
statutes, has never expressly considered supplemental jurisdiction. As a
5. See, ag., 1.FmEDENTm-., M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 1, §§ 2.12-2.14 (discussing
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction under the rubric '"judicially created jurisdiction"); F. JAMES & G.

HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 2.7, at 61-62 (3d ed. 1985) (ancillary and pendent jurisdiction described as "product[s] of decisional law rather than statute").
6. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
7. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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result, the law of supplemental jurisdicfion is more confused today than
it was before the Court spoke.
I propose a new, principled approach to the question of congressional authorization of supplemental jurisdiction, one that identifies the
source of the statutory grant of supplemental jurisdiction and recognizes
its policy underpinnings. Supplemental jurisdiction is rooted in those
portions of the jurisdictional statutes granting power over a "civil action." That Congress, in effect, delegated to the judiciary the power to
define that term is shown not only by the statutory language but also by
its delegation to the Supreme Court of the power to prescribe the joinder
rules that establish the scope of the litigative unit.
My approach requires study of the two distinct, and seemingly inconsistent, lines of cases mentioned above, as well as related portions of
the jurisdictional statutes. The consistently narrow interpretations of
original jurisdiction are based on those parts of the statutes relating to
the basis ofjurisdiction, such as federal question or diversity of citizenship. In contrast, the supplemental jurisdiction cases are based on the
statutory phrase giving jurisdiction over an entire civil action, notjust the
jurisdiction-invoking claim. Each portion of the statute is supported by
important policies; while the narrow construction of original jurisdiction
respects federalism and avoids overwhelming federal court workloads,
the broad construction of supplemental jurisdiction, when combined with
the joinder rules, promotes efficient packaging of disputes and avoids duplicative litigation and the risk of inconsistent results.
The proper resolution of any supplemental jurisdiction problem,
then, requires recognition of these separate statutory bases and policies.
Each line of authority should be allowed to operate in its proper sphere.
After the narrow restrictions on invocation of jurisdiction have been satisfied, the court will have ftfilled the policies underlying those restrictions. Then it should flesh out the scope of the entire civil action through
the joinder rules and supplemental jurisdiction, effectuating the separate
policies that support entertaining the entire civil action. It is here that
the Supreme Court erred in Aldinger andKroger. By failing to recognize
that it was dealing with separate statutory authorizations and policies,
the Court imported the restrictions on invocation of original jurisdiction
into the supplemental jurisdiction realm, where such restrictions simply
are not appropriate.
Part I of this article traces the development of the line of cases narrowing the statutory provisions for the invocation of federal jurisdiction,
identifying the policies underlying that development both from a public-
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interest and an interest-group perspective." Part II contains a similar
analysis of the line of cases developing broad supplemental jurisdiction
and discusses the tension between the two lines. 9 Part III reconciles the
narrow and the broad jurisdictional readings, setting forth a statutory
model for supplemental jurisdiction that debunks the myth of common
law subject matter jurisdiction and sets forth a principled, consistent
method for approaching supplemental jurisdiction problems.1 0 Part IV
contrasts that model's resolution ofAldinger and Kroger with the Court's
actual treatment of these two cases.11 Finally, Part V assesses the impact
of Aldinger and Kroger, and concludes that they fail to establish any
principles for dealing with congressional authorization of supplemental
12
jurisdiction.
I. NARRow INTERPRETATIONS OF JURISDICTIONAL GRANTS
The Constitution sets the outer boundaries of federal jurisdiction,
permitting Congress to empower the lower federal courts to entertain
"cases or controversies" falling within those boundaries.13 This jurisdiction is not self-executing; Congress must prescribe it.14 The Supreme
Court has consistently given narrow readings to the statutory language
used by Congress to establish jurisdictional bases. 15 The two most important bases of federal court jurisdiction-diversity of citizenship and
general federal question-provide good examples.
A.

Background and History.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered the lower federal courts to
hear diversity cases.16 Although the relevant language mirrored that of
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra notes 13-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81-122 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 123-51 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 152-212 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 213-24 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See generally P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MisHKI & H. WECHS-

LER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 309-438 (2d ed.
1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].

14. See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) ("[The judicial power of the United
States... is.. . dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise,
entirely upon the action of Congress ... ."). Although this proposition is considered axiomatic
today, it resulted from a long judicial struggle and arguably is not consistent with the intent of the
framers. See ClintonA Mandatory View ofFederalCourtJurisdiction:EarlyImplementation ofand
Departuresfromthe ConstitutionalPlan, 86 COLuM. L. Ruv. 1515, 1616 (1986).
15. See generally 13 C. WIGHTi, A. M4ILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3526, at 232 (2d ed. 1984). See also infra text accompanying notes 16-80.
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, cb. 20, § 1I, I Stat.73, 78 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)
(1982)).
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the Constitution, 17 the Supreme Court in Strawbridge v.Curtiss18 interpreted the statute to require complete diversity between all plaintiffs and
all defendants. 19 The Court gave no reason for its restrictive reading; it
pointed to no legislative history or indication of congressional intent, nor
did it purport to rely on the slight linguistic differences between the statute and the Constitution.

Congress has revised the diversity statute eight times in the ensuing
two centuries. 20 Yet it has never either expressly incorporated the complete diversity rule into the statute or expressly rejected it. Thus the
complete diversity requirement survives, on the theory that Congress implicitly adopted it in the subsequent reenactments. 21
Despite the statute's almost verbatim use of the relevant constitutional language, 2 2 the Court has also interpreted the grant of general fed-

eral question jurisdiction narrowly. 23 It has used two devices to narrow
federal question jurisdictional statutes: a limited interpretation of

17. The Constitution provides for jurisdiction over controversies "between Citizens of diterent
States." U.S. CoNsr. art. HI, § 2. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for diversity jurisdiction
when a "suit [wasl between a citizen of the state where the suit [was] brought, and a citizen of
another state" and the amount in controversy exceeded $500. Judiciary Act of 1789, oh. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. 73, 78. The statute is today codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982), and provides for jurisdiction over "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $I0,000...
and is between.., citizens of diffierent States."
18. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
19. See infra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
20. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (pt. 3) (setting amount-in-controversy
requirement at $500 for diversity actions); Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552-53
(increasing amount-in-controversy requirement to $2000); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Pub. L. No.
61-475, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091-94 (increasing amount-in-controversy requirement to $3000); Act
of Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 117, Pub. L. No. 76-463, 54 Stat. 143, 143 (providing that the District of
Columbia and the territories of Alaska and Hawaii be treated as states for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction); Act of July 26, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-808, 70 Stat. 658 (providing that Puerto Rico be
treated as a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554,
§ 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (increasing amoimt-in-controversy requirement to $I0,000); Act of Aug. 14,
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-439, § 1, 78 Stat. 445, 445 (defining corporate citizenship for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction); Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 3, 90 Stat. 2891, 2891 (extending
diversity jurisdiction to encompass actions brought by a foreign state against citizens of a state).
21. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing implicit adoption as a traditional
canon of statutory construction).
22. The Constitution provides for jurisdiction over "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority." U.S. Coiqsr. art. HI, § 2. The original general federal question statute provided
for jurisdiction over "any suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity... arising under the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority ....t
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-73 (pt. 3). The statute is today codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), and provides for jurisdiction over "all civil actions... aris[ing] under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
23. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
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whether a claim "arises under" federal law, and the "well-pleaded complaint" rule.
The first of these devices concerns the quantum of federal material
that must be present to invoke federal question jurisdiction. In Osborn v.
Bank of the United States,24 the Court held that constitutional power
existed whenever federal law was an ingredient in the cause of action. 25
A similar reading of the legislative grant of federal question jurisdiction

would have opened the floodgates to a torrent of cases. 26 Although the
Court in the PacificRailroadRemoval Cases27 interpreted the statute as
coextensive with the constitutional grant, it quickly perceived the potential workload problem and "acted understandably in giving a restrictive

reading to the statute.128 The resulting interpretation of the statutory

"arising under" phrase is narrower than the interpretation given the constitutional grant in Osborn.29
The second device the Court has used to narrow federal question

jurisdiction is the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Louisville & Nashville
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
25. Id. at 819-20. See also C. WRiGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 92-94 (4th ed.
1983) (discussing impact of Osborn); Matasar,Rediscovering "One ConstitutionalCase'r Procedural
Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for SupplementalJurisdiction,71 CALIF. L. REv. 1399,
1409-17 (1983) (tracing development of supplemental jurisdiction and discussing Osborn).
26. For example, such a reading would have provided for jurisdictiou over title disputes in
which title is traceable to an original federal grant, "even though the controverted questions normally are of fact or of local land law." T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert, denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965). See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900) (rejecting federal jurisdiction in such a situation).
27. 115 U.S. I (1885) (upholding federal question jurisdiction over common law tort actions
against federally chartered railroads). The Court later described the case as an "unfortunate decision." Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.50 (1959). Congress
remedied the problem created by the case with legislation providing that federal question jurisdiction
may be based on a corporation's federal charter only if the United States owns more than half of the
capital stock of the corporation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1982). Butsee International Refugee Org. v.
Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858, 860 (4th Cir. 1951) (providing for federal jurisdiction over state
claims by international organizations authorized by federal statute to "institute legal proceedings").
28. C. WRiOHT, supra note 25, § 17, at 92.
29. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 379 n.51 ("Mhe many limitations which have been placed on
jurisdiction under § 1331 are not limitations on the constitutional power of Congress to conferjuris.
diction on the federal courts."). This process of narrowing the statutory reach continues today. See
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986), noted in The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1, 230-40 (1986).
Although courts and commentators agree that the statutory phrase "arising under" is interpreted more narrowly than the constitutional grant, there is little consensus on the precise scope of
that interpretation. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 17, at 93 (noting that although Osborn has
been rejected as a statutory theory, "[ilt is not easy to state what has been substituted in its stead");
see also HAR & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 844-926; M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 53-77 (1980); Cohen, The Broken Compass:
The Requirement that a Case Arise 'Directly" Under FederalLaw, 115 U. PA. L. Rv. 890 (1967);
Currie, The FederalCourtsand the American Law Institute (PartI-), 36 U. CHL L. REV. 268, 27679 (1969); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the DistrictCourts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1953).
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Railroad Co. v. Mottley 30 contains the most famous statement of this
rule: the basis for the federal court's jurisdiction must appear on the face
of a proper complaint, and may not be based on federal issues raised by
way of defense or counterclaim. 31 The rule can result in a federal court's
having no jurisdiction in a case that centers on federal law.3 2 The narrow
interpretation of the federal question statute has often resulted in issues
33
of federal substantive law being decided by state courts.
There are strong policy reasons for construing jurisdictional statutes
more narrowly than the corresponding constitutional grants; most commentators note that the Constitution is by nature a general document,
and that Congress has been left room to grant such specific portions of
the whole as it deems necessary.3 4 Although there is support for concluding that Congress intended to extend jurisdiction to the constitutional limit with both diversity and federal question jurisdiction,3 5 the
Court has consistently resisted this conclusion.

30. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
31. Id at 153-54. I use the term "proper compIaint" to reflect the Court's holding that jurisdiction cannot be based on the anticipation in a complaint of a federal issue that might be raised by a
defense to that complaint. See id. at 152-54; see also J. FAENTRHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLII,
supra note 1, § 2.4; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 5, § 2.6; C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 18.
32. This is true even with respect to a matter ostensibly entrusted exclusively to the federal
courts. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 2.4, at 23-24. For
example, assume an action in state court by a patentee to collect royalties owed by his licensee for
use of a patented device. The licensee defends by asserting that the patent is void for want of originality. Absent diversity, the case cannot be removed. There is no federal question jurisdiction, since
the federal issue is injected into the case by way of defense, and would not appear in a well-pleaded
complaint as required by Mottley. Yet the major issue to be resolved in the case is the validity of the
patent. Even though federal courts have by statute excusivejurisdiction over "any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents," 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982), this case will be
decided by a state court. See, eg., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); see also Chisum, The
Allocation ofJurisdictionBetween State and FederalCourts in PatentLitigation, 46 WASH. L. REV.
633, 657-64 (1971).
33. The rule's value as a relatively simple test applied to the initial pleading of the suit is generally thought to outweigh this "loss" of cases to state court. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, supra note 1, § 2.4, at 23 ("Given the limited nature of federal subject matter jurisdiction,
it is essential that the existence ofjurisdiction be determined at the outset rather than being contingent upon what may occur at later stages in the litigation."). Nonetheless, the rule has not been the
subject of universal praise. Id. § 2.4, at 22-24; C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 18, at 98-102. Moreover, it is not a simple rule when declaratory relief is sought. See L., § 18, at 100.02.
34. See generallyHART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 870-73 (discussing the extent to which
statutory grants of federal question jurisdiction by Congress in 1789 and 1875 did not confer the
entire scope ofjurisdiction allowed by the Constitution, despite the use of language identical to that
found in the Constitution). There are several strong policies supporting narrow statutory construction. See infra text accompanying notes 36-53.
35. This is especially so with regard to the federal question statute. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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TraditionalCanons of Statutory Construction and the Emergence
of a Consistent Policy.

Two traditional canons of statutory construction 36 have played a
significant role in the narrow readings of grants of original jurisdiction.
The Court has ignored one traditional canon, the plain meaning rule, and
has adhered rigorously to another, the canon of implicit adoption. The
result has been a consistent policy of narrow construction.
The plain meaning rule requires that the legislature be taken at its
word when it uses langnage of clear meaning.37 This canon prohibits
reference to anything other than the terms of the statute, much as the
parol evidence rule precludes use of extrinsic evidence to alter the meaning of a written contract. Like the parol evidence rule, the plain meaning
rule was eroded when courts began to look to legislative history as evidence of the legislature's true intent.
The Supreme Court ignored this rule when it formulated its original
narrow interpretations of the jurisdictional statutes. Under the plain
meaning rule, the original diversity statute would have extended jurisdiction to the constitutional limit, since the statute tracked the relevant constitutional language. Only some policy, which Congress did not state
and which Chief Justice Marshall declined to discuss in Strawbridge,
could have justified the narrower construction.
There is even more evidence that Congress intended that the original general federal question statute embrace the entire quantum of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction. Not only did the statute's drafter
track the relevant constitutional langnage, he also stated in floor debate
that the intent was to vest the entire constitutional federal question jurisdiction.38 Indeed, based on his interpretation of Supreme Court prece36. See generally J. HuR, DEALING WIT STATUTES 56-65 (1982); J. SUTHERLAND, STAT-

trlES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. 1972). There is increasing interest in the traditional
canons, no doubt due in part to the Supreme Court's increasing interest in legislative history. See
Carro & Brann, The U. Supreme Court and the Use ofLegislativeHistorier A StatistcalAnalysis,
22 JURIMET1RICS J. 294 (1982); see also Harris, The Politicsof Statutory Construction, 1985 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 745, 787 (Court's use of "restrictive canons of construction used in the nineteenth century"
has become "more common").
37. See L POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 276-79 (1985); Wald, Some

Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv.
195, 215-16 (1983).
38. Senator Matthew Carpenter, a member of the Judiciary Cdmmittee, drafted the general

federal question statute and was manager of the bill in the Senate. See 2 CONG. RE.. 4984 (1874); 3
CONG. REc. 2168 (1875). During the debate, he asserted that "[t]his bill gives precisely the power
which the Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less." 2 CONG. REC. 4987 (1874). See also
id. at 4985-86 (similar statements by Sen. Carpenter). Statements by the author or floor manager of
legislation are traditionally entitled to substantial weight in legislative history analysis. See Wald,
supra note 37, at 201.
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dent, he thought that it would have been unconstitutional to do
otherwise. 39 Despite this evidence, the Court wasted no time in imposing
"statutory" limitations; it espoused the well-pleaded complaint rule, for
example, just two years after the statute was enacted! 0
Although it has ignored the plain meaning canon, the Supreme
Court has adhered scrupulously to the canon of implicit adoption, under
which the reenactment of a statute without criticism of judicial interpretations is considered a legislative adoption of those interpretations. 4 1 The
Court initially interpreted the language of both the diversity and general
federal question statutes narrowly. In each case, Congress reenacted the*
statute without changing it so as to "overrule" the narrowing precedent.
The implicit adoption canon permits the federal courts to assume that
Congress has adopted the Court's restrictive interpretations. 42 Thus today we speak of the complete diversity rule and the well-pleaded complaint rule as "statutory requirements."
But they are not statutory at all, of course, at least not in the sense
that Congress expressed them. The Court imposed them, and Congress
did nothing to change the Court's imposition. It is not immediately or
intuitively obvious that reenactment without amendment justifies the
conclusion that Congress intended to incorporate the restrictive interpretation. There is no gnarantee that members of Congress were aware of
the judicial interpretations. Those who were may not have agreed with
the interpretation and may have felt that the reenactment without comment constituted a rejection of the restriction. 43 There is simply no way
to tell."4
The leading studies of the history of the 1875 legislation are Chadboum & Levin, Original

Jurisdiction ofFederal Quetons, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1942), and Forrester, Federal Question
Jurisdictionand Section 5, 18 TUL L. REv. 263 (1943).
39. 2 CONG. REc. 4986-87 (1874). Senator Carpenter was led to this conclusion by language in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 330 (1816) ("If,then, it is a duty of congress to
vest the judicial power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicial power."). See
Forrester, supra note 38, at 277 n.36. That view, expressed in Martin by Justice Story, was not to
prevail and indeed had been repudiated thirty years before Senator Carpenter's remarks. See Cary v.
Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). See also Clinton, supra note 14, at 1581-90 (discussing

Martin and Cary).
40. Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203-04 (1877).
41. Even Judge Friendly, described as a "most trenchant critic" of the canons, R. POSNER,

supra note 37, at 282, occasionally invoked this particular rule. See ag., Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin,
Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. See, eg., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978); Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339 (1969).
43. H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 232-33 (1967).
44. As Judge Posner points out, this canon of statutory construction assumes legislative omniscience. R. POSNER, supra note 37, at 282-83.
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I do not suggest that the Court is disingenuous in this selective use
of traditional canons. As Judge Wald has noted, selective invocation of
the canons is quite proper 4 5 The canons are, in her colorful phrase,
"drawn out as needed, much as a golfer selects the proper club when he
gauges the distance to the pin and the contours of the course." 46 And the
result of the Court's selective use of the canons has been consistent:
grants of original jurisdiction are read narrowly.
This consistent result is supported by compelling, though usually
unarticulated, public policy. Strawbridge was but one of several cases in
which the Marshall Court recognized strict limits on federal court
power.4 7 Although the Court's interpretation seems inconsistent with
Chief Justice Marshall's federalist politics, the historical and political
context explains a great deal. The first decade of the nineteenth century
was, of course, a period of great political tension during which the relations between the governmental branches were being tested.4 8 The Marshall Court's parsimony with diversity jurisdiction reflected a recognition
of the national government's status as a sovereign of limited powers, and
at the same time served to "deflect[] political attacks that might be
mounted against judicial aggrandizement." 49 This limitation thus insulated the Court from criticism for overstepping the separation of powers
principle at a tense time, and may have staved off legislative restrictions
that would have hampered its growth as an institution.5 0
The restrictions on general federal question jurisdiction came about
much later, of course, since that basis of jurisdiction was not established
until 1875.:1 As noted, these restrictions were from the outset seen as
45. Wald, supra note 37, at 215-16.

46. Id
47. See generally 2 G. HAsgiNs & H. JOHNSO,
UNITED STATES 614-18 (1981).

HIsTORY OF THE SuPREmE COURT OF THE

48. See generally id.; P. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 36-53 (1960).
49. 2 G. HAsKINs & H. JoHNSON, supra note 47, at 615.

50. The best example of the Marshall Court's brilliant acceptance of limitations on jurisdiction
as part of consolidation of its own importance is Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
In Marbury, the Court rejected legislative efrorts to extend its power past constitutional limits,
thereby simultaneously embarrassing President Jefferson and avoiding the confrontation with Congress that might have ensued if the Court bad simply ignored these legislatively bestowed powers.
See 2 G. HAsiNs & H. JoHNsoN,supra note 47, at 615.
Chief Justice Marshall did not expressly recognize in Strawbridge that the Constitntion would
permit a broader interpretation of diversity jurisdiction. Nonetheless it seems clear that he recognized that his holding was not constitutionally mandated. Years after Strawbridge, when the governmental tensions had abated, Marshall expressed regret about some of the restrictive opinions of
the early period of his judicial career, most notably Strawbridge. See Louisville C. & C. R.R. v.
Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555-56 (1844) (Justice Wayne recounting discussions with Marshall).
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ci. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470-73 (pt. 3) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982)). See generally HART & WEcHSLER, supra note 13, at 844-50 (tracing the complicated history of federal question jurisdiction).
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serving the purpose of docket control, useful not only to preclude a possi-

bly crushing increase in caseload, but also to ferret out cases of little
federal policy interest, such as disputes involving realty with title traceable to a federal grant5 2
These currents of public, policy still support the narrow interpretation of statutory grants of jurisdiction, which respects the states' domain
by limiting federal court intrusion in matters that state courts can easily
decide. It also avoids swamping the federal courts with a caseload both
quantitatively overwhelming and qualitatively unimportant. Finally, the
Court's consistency gives Congress a bright-line test: if the legislature
disagrees with the Court's iterpretation of a statute, it must expressly
"overrule" it in a reenactment.5 3
All of these policies can be seen as in the public interest. Some are
consistent, however, with private goals. For example, federal judges
have a personal interest in the quantity and quality of their caseload.

This natural interest suggests another way to assess the jurisdictional
grants.
C.

The Resulting Symbiosis: Suggesting an Interest-GroupAnalysis of
JurisdictionalLegislation.
The interaction between the federal courts and Congress has led to

an interesting symbiosis. Congress is fairly passive in this relationship.
It has reenacted the diversity and general federal question statutes without much more than some fine-tuning, such as straightening out corporate citizenship or adjusting the amount-in-controversy requirement.5 4 It
52. See supra note 26.
53. Still, one wonders how Congress could ever succeed in vesting jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. If Congress intends to vest broad jurisdiction in the lower federal courts, the Court will
apparently require it to do so by means of some sort of superlegislative action. Congress has already
tried using the constitutional language and indicating in the legislative history that it intended to vest
jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
It is unlikely that Congress could succeed in overriding the implicit adoption canon by "overruling!' the Court in successive legislation. Indeed, it would probably be more difficult to satisfy this
superlegislative requirement than it is to override a presidential veto, even though the latter vote
requires a supermajority. First, the presidential veto is a more direct rejection of the legislation than
is a narrow judicial interpretation, which can be couched in reasonable terms regarding perceived
linguistic ambiguities in the statute. Second, the veto will almost always be well publicized, making
the legislation a topic of public discussion, possibly galvanizing Congress. Finally, the veto is iminediate, while the narrow judicial construction may take place years after the legislation passed, and
thus may be presented to a body much different from the one that passed the statute, one that takes
no offense at the judicial interpretation.
For a discussion of the relationship between the federal judiciary and Congress, see infra notes
54-80 and accompanying text.
54. See, eg., Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (increasing
amount in controversy to $10,000 and defining corporate citizenship); Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L.
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has done nothing to change the judicial restrictions on the invocation of
jurisdiction, and thus has led the courts to assume that their restrictive
interpretations have been accepted.
This relationship, and the jurisdictional statutes that spawned it,
may be analyzed through the economic or interest-group model of legislation. Although by no means new,55 that model has received increasing
S6
attention in the scholarly literature recently, both as a general theory
and as an aid to understanding specific statutes.5 7 Commentators, however, have not rigorously applied the model to jurisdictional legislation.
Nor shall I. My purpose here is merely to suggest such an approach, as
an alternative to the public-policy justifications discussed above.
The central theme of the interest-group model is that statutes are
commodities sold by the legislature to the highest bidder.58 Thus legislation is essentially a bargain between the legislature and some interest
group benefited by the legislation. The legislature and the interest group
must rely on other governmental branches, including the courts, to act as
agents to enforce the bargain.5 9 These agents are presumed to be "rational economic actors" who will enforce the statute in a way that fosters
their own concerns as much as possible. 60 To the extent that views of the
agent diverge from those of the principal, the principal's goal may not be
61
fully realized. Economists call these thwarting factors "agency costs."
No. 96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369, 2369 (eliminating amount-in-controversy requirement in federal

question cases).
55. See ag., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56-65 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (discussing
factions); JUSTIc E OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK Nociics AND UNCOLLECTED LEI iRS
AND PAPERS 108-09 (H. Shriver ed. 1936) (describing legislation as "a means by which a body,

having the power, puts burdens which are disagreeable to them on the shoulders ofsomebody else");
see also Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961)
(asserting that it is not illegal "for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring
about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors").
56. See, ag., R. MCCORMICK & R. ToLLiSON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION AND THE ECON-

OMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTERESr-GRouP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT (1981); Landes & Pos-

ner, The IndependentJudiciaryin anInterest-GroupPerspective 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Macey,
PromotingPublc-RegardingLegislation Through StatutoryInterpretation:An Interest Group Model,

86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986).
57. See, ag., Macey, Special Interest GroupsLegislation and the Judictal Function: The Di-

lemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.L 1 (1984); Maloney & McCormick, A Positive Theory of
EnvironmentalQuality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99 (1982).
58. See g., Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 877.
59. See, eg., Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehaviour,Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
60. See, eg., Macey, supra note 56, at 244-46. See generally Y, ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 223-28; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, VerticalIntegration,AppropriableRent;
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297 (1978).
61. My purpose here is to sketch the preliminary outline ofan interest-group theory ofjurisdictional legislation, upon which I intend to elaborate in a future article. As with any preliminary
theoretical sketch, I run the risk of painting with too broad a brush. In general terms, I see the
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Jurisdictional statutes appear to fit this basic model nicely; they may
be seen essentially as deals between the legislature and the organized bar.

This relationship was made clear in 1978, when Congress rejected the
most recent proposal to abolish general diversity jurisdiction 62-a proposal that was supported by the President, the Attorney General, the Chief
Justice, 63 and many other leading members of the federal bench.64
Simply put, the opposition-the organized bar-won Congress's
favor. The ABA Board of Governors, the American Trial Lawyers As-

sociation, and state bars or bar committees from all fifty states opposed
the legislation. 65 This sentiment appeared to come from all parts of the
profession. As one commentator reported, during the decade in which
the proposal was before Congress in one form or another, "it is doubtful
[whether] as many as two private practitioners... ever appeared in support of it.''66
Seen in these terms, the traditional scholarly debate regarding the
"deal" here as one between Congress and the organized bar. In reality, we might expect to find some
divergence of opinion within the bar as a whole. For example, one might expect small, rural law
firms to prefer abolition of diversity jurisdiction, which could increase their chances of doing battle
before the local state court judge. Large, national law firms, on the other hand, might prefer expanded diversity jurisdiction; members of such firms may feel more comfortable litigating in federal
court and may feel that state courts in smaller cities are biased.
One study indicates, however, that virtually all quarters of the practicing profession support the
retention of diversity jurisdiction. See Frank, The Casefor Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 403, 404-05 & n.3 (1979). But see Sheran & Isaacman, State CasesBelong in State Cours, 12
CREioHToN L. REv. 1, 52 (1978) ("The only groups who still argue strongly for diversity jurisdiction are the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, whose members specialize in personal injury
litigation, and corporate lawyers whose clients prefer the federal courts.").
62. On two occasions in 1978, the House approved proposals to abolish general diversity jurisdiction, but neither bill reached a vote in the Senate. See 124 CONG. REC. 5008 (1978); 124 CONG.
REC. 33,546 (1978). These proposals would have retained federal interpleader jurisdiction, a position embraced by most of those favoring abolition of general diversity jurisdiction. See C WRioHT,
supra note 25, § 23, at 129.
63. See Frank, supra note 61, at 404.
64. A number of leading federal judges, past and present, have made their positions known in
the academic literature. See, ag., H. FEJIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 13952 (1973); R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 37
(1955); Frankfurter, DlstrlbutionofJudicialPowerBetween UnitedStates and State Courts, 13 CURNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); Haynsworth, Book Review, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1082, 1089-91 (1974) (reviewing H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973)); see also Hearingson the

State of the Judiciary,95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) (views of Chief Justice Burger, Judge Bell, and
Judge Friendly). Justice Brandeis also favored abolishing general diversity jurisdiction. See
Friendly, Marching Into the Third Century, JUDOES' J., Spring 1977, at 6, 8. See generally Kastenmeler & Remington, Court Reform andAccess to Justice".4 Legislative Perspective, 16 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 301, 312-13 (1979) (describing the list of critics of diversity jurisdiction as "a lawyer's
Hall of Fame"). But see Wright, The FederalCourts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
WAYNE L. REV. 317 (1967) (federal judge favoring diversity jurisdiction).
65. Frank, supra note 61, at 404-05 & n.3.
66. Mdat 404. Few statistics on attorney preferences are available. One fairly recent poll of
practicing lawyers showed that 69% opposed abolishing diversity jurisdiction, 26% favored aboli-
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historical and contemporary justifications for diversity jurisdiction 67
pales. We do not keep diversity jurisdiction because of fear of local prejudice, or out of a desire to have federal judges retain facility with the
common law,68 or for any of the reasons normally addressed in the scholarly debate. We keep diversity jurisdiction because a politically influential group wants it-for whatever reason-and is powerful enough to get
69
Congress to reject every effort to take it away.
We know little about why the bar wants diversity jurisdiction. Perhaps some members agree with the traditional reasons set forth in the
scholarly debate favoring diversity. More likely, they are motivated by
more pragmatic considerations. Diversity jurisdiction provides an alternative forum, an option that lawyers can offer to clients.70 Possibly, the
defense of diversity is nothing more than a knee-jerk reaction by a group
that feels that a vested interest is being threatened.7 1 This may not be a
traditional (or even a good) reason to retain diversity jurisdiction, but it
may make sense to the interest group in position to lobby successfully for
its continuing existence.
If the jurisdictional legislation may be seen as a bargain between the
legislature and the bar, the agent charged with enforcement of the bargain is the federal judiciary. Yet, as the interest-group model would predict, this agent, when enforcing the bargain, seeks to advance its own
goals.7 2 Every jurisdictional grant increases the workload of the federal
judges; such legislation affects them directly and they have an incentive
to reduce the flow of cases into their courts. The federal judiciary's general antipathy toward diversity jurisdiction 73 may be a response to this
tion, and 5% were undecided. Law Poll of Affirmative Action, Judfcial Selection, and Diversity of
CitizenshIp Jurisdiction, 66 A.B.A. . 148, 149 (1980). See also supra note 61.
67. The scholarly debate over retention of diversity jurisdiction continues to rage after two
centuries and has generated an enormous literature. See generally 13B C WRimGH, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 15, §§ 3530-3531.1, at 337-63 (summary of arguments and citations to leading
works).
68. These are among the several traditional justificatios for diversity jurisdiction. See fd. at
339-43; Frank, supra note 61, at 409.
69. C. WRIGmT, supra note 25, § 23, at 137 (noting that the future ofdiversity jurisdiction will
probably not be resolved on the merits, since "[a]ny proposal to modify diversity meets immediate
organized opposition from those who believe that they have a vested interest in preserving, for their
own advantage, the widest possible choice of forum").
70. Frank, supra note 61, at 405 (abolition of diversity jurisdiction would "deprive the bar...
of a resource which it values"). See also C. WmiGHT, supra note 25, § 23, at 135 (recognizing that
litigants may use choice of forum for tactical purposes).
71. See supra note 69.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
73. As noted, sketching a general preliminary theory always presents the danger of overgeneralization. I do not mean to imply that all federal judges favor abolition ofdiversity jurisdiction. Certainly, however, a noteworthy number of leading federal judges have publicly taken that position. It
may be that the reaction varies at trial and appellate levels. Appellate judges have written most of
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incentive. No doubt some judges would abolish diversity to gain personal leisure.74 Others oppose diversity jurisdiction because they cannot
render precedential decisions on matters of state law.75 And others resent the way diversity cases impose on their consideration and resolution
of what they perceive as more challenging and important federal substan76
tive legal questions.
Of course, the bench has no incentive to strain relations with Congress. 77 Although Article I judges enjoy life tenure and immunity from
salary cuts, 7 8 Congress can freeze judicial salaries and can cut funding
for law clerks, secretaries, and office equipment from paper clips to word
processors. 79 This congressional power imposes pragmatic limits on the

federal judiciary's ability to maximize its own priorities.
Thus there are both strong public-policy and interest-group underpinnings supporting the narrow construction of statutory jurisdictional
grants. From either standpoint, though, Congress has a recognized role
in the development of policy. The courts, aware that they are interpreting statutes, address the statutory language and express concern with
the critical literature. See supra note 64. Interestingly, however, many trial judges-those on whom
the burden of diversity jurisdiction is greatest-have shown great sympathy to inclusive joinder in
diversity cases, despite the Supreme Court's signal that they need not do so. See infra notes 220-24
and accompanying text.
74. See Landes & Posner, Legal Change,JudicialBehavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction,9 J.
LEG;AL STUD. 367, 369-70 (1980) ("[J]udges, like other people, are rational maximizers of their
satisfactions, which include not only pecuniary income but other things which people value, such as
leisure, prestige, and power.").
75. As Judge Haynsworth has noted:
Erie took all the fun out of the diversityjurisdiction for the federaljudge. If the state law is
clear ... the federal judge may only play the "ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some
particular state." If the state law is unclear, the federal judge is not free to search for the
rule that should be applied. He is limited to guessing what the highest court of a state
would do if the case were before it.
Haynsworth, supra note 64, at 1089 (quoting Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d
Cir. 1942)).
76. See Landes & Posner, supra note 74, at 369-72. I do not suggest that the federal bench is
interested in the three-day work week. To the contrary, one of the principal arguments by judges
against diversity jurisdiction is that it takes time away from federal question cases, as to which the
federal bench is the only definitive arbiter. Diversity cases, on the other hand, involve state substantive law, as to which only state courts can give authoritative interpretations. In view of some federal
court hostility toward diversity jurisdiction, see supra note 62 and accompanying text, one might
expect federal courts to impose more judicial restrictions in that type of case. Indeed, as suggested
below, the Supreme Court's major supplemental jurisdiction cases of the 1970's may be seen as a
statement of antidiversity bias unsupported by congressional sanction. See infra text accompanying
notes 219-21.
77. Although Congress has accepted without criticism somejndicially imposed restrictions on
the invocation of jurisdiction, see supra notes 13-35 and accompanying text, its consistent rejection
of efforts to abolish diversity jurisdiction suggests that there are limits to the federal judiciary's
leeway to impose restrictions on jurisdiction invocation.
78. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
79. See Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 885.
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congressional intent. A sharp contrast to this approach is evident in the
line of cases involving supplemental jurisdiction. Here, the courts
broadly interpret the litigative unit with little or no mention of congressional intent. The hegemony of the courts is so striking that many observers have concluded that supplemental jurisdiction constitutes
common law development of subject matter jurisdiction. 80
H.

BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE LITIGATIVE UNIT

While it was limiting the reach of original jurisdictional grants, the
Supreme Court was promoting something seemingly contradictory: the
packaging of an entire dispute into a single piece of litigation, notwithstanding that some portions of the case were not supported by independent bases of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court instigated and
supported this trend toward joining federal and nonfederal claims in two
major ways: by recognizing and expanding supplemental jurisdiction, 8 1
and by promulgating the joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
2
Procedure.8
A. Supplemental Jurisdictionand the JoinderRules: Confluence of
Proceduraland ConstitutionalTests.
The Supreme Court recognized in 1824 that a federal court may
decide matters of state law in a federal question case. In Osborn v. Bank
of the United States,8 3 Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[tihere is
scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."8 4 Because the federal court had jurisdiction over the entire case, it had power to determine incidental
nonfederal substantive questions.85 In the early twentieth century, the
Court upheld the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a separate
nonfederal claim that was part of the same cause of action as a pending
86
federal claim.
80. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 1.
82. FED. R. CIV.. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) (permissive coun-

terclaims); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (cross-claims); FED. R. CV. P. 13(h) (adding parties on counterclaim and cross-claim); FED. R. Cv. P. 14(a) (hnpleader claims; claims by third-party defendant
against plaintiff, claims by plaintiff against third-party defendant); FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (joinder of
claims and remedies); FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (joinder of parties needed for just adjudication); FED. R.
Civ. P.20 (permissivejoinder of parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 22 (interpleader); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)
(intervention of right); FED. R. Qv. P. 24(b) (permissive intervention).
83. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
84. Id. at 820.
85. I at 823.
86. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933) (federal copyright infringement claim and state
unfair competition claim held to be "two grounds in support of a single cause of action"); Siler v.
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In 1861, the Court expressly recognized supplemental jurisdiction
over nonfederal claims joined to a pending case. In Freeman v. Howe, 87
the federal court had custody of property that was the center of dispute.
Unless the Supreme Court allowed potentially affected absentees, whose
joinder would have destroyed complete diversity, to intervene in the federal action, they might have been denied a forum in which to press their
claims to the property. Using this implicit necessity as its justification,
the Court upheld jurisdiction over such "ancillary and dependent
[claims] 88. . . without reference to the citizenship or residence of the
parties."
Commentators universally characterize Freeman as a case in which
supplemental jurisdiction was necessary to avoid a violation of due process;89 if the Court had not allowed the intervenors to litigate in the federal court that held the disputed property, they would have been denied a
hearing. But this reasoning assumes that the efficient packaging ought to
take place in federal, and not state, court. Due process obviously does
not compel this result. Indeed, due process could have been satisfied in
Freeman-andthe Strawbridge rule left unsullied-by dismissing the entire case under the doctrine of indispensable parties90 and allowing all
parties to litigate in state court.
The Court overlooked that option, however, and chose instead to
facilitate packaging in federal court, thereby implying that Strawbridge
would be subordinated to the goal of inclusive packaging, at least as far
as joined claims were concerned. In public-interest terms, this recognition of supplemental jurisdiction made the federal court a more efficient
forum for dispute resolution. If the Court had insisted on separate
grounds of jurisdiction for each joined claim, the litigants might have
been forced to undertake duplicative litigation in state and federal court,
Louisville & N. RL.R, 213 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1909) (federal claim of due process violation vested

court with jurisdiction over state claim that statute did not empower commission to issue rates). See
also Schenkier, EnsuringAccess to FederalCourts A Revised RationaleforPendent Jurisdiction,75
Nw. U.L. REv. 245, 251-55 (1980) (discussing evolution of pendent jurisdiction to accommodate
changing perceptions of federalism).

87. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
88. Id. at 460-61.
89. See, ag., C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 9, at 29.

90. The intervenors could have been considered subject to compulsory joinder, since they could
have been prejudiced had the suit gone forward without them. Because joinder would have destroyed diversity jurisdiction and because an alternative forum in state court was apparently available, the Court should have dismissed the case. See Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139

(1855) (establishing indispensable parties doctrine). Supplemental jurisdiction has not been permitted in the Indispensable parties situation. See Freer, supra note 2, at 1085-88. As currently formulated, the indispensable parties rule implicitly rejects supplemental jurisdiction. See FED. L Civ. P.
19(b) (joinder compelled only if it would not affect subject matter jurisdiction).
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an obviously undesirable result both to the litigants and to society.9 1
There is also an interest-group explanation for this recognition of
supplemental jurisdiction. If inclusive packaging were unavailable in
federal court, many litigants would eschew that forum altogether and go
to state court, where there are no such jurisdictional restrictions.
Although the federal courts ought not be overburdened, undersubscription has costs as well. Failure to facilitate packaging through development of supplemental jurisdiction might have left the federal courts
underused, hearing only cases involving relatively few parties, where
joinder would not violate Strawbrdge.92 Such highly specialized courts
might not be a tool of real utility to the bar93 and might not command
great prestige.9 4 In interest-group terms, then, the federal judiciary's desire to maximize prestige might lead to an expansion of supplemental
jurisdiction. Thus the public interest in efficient litigation and interestgroup theory both support some liberality in facilitating joinder.
The Court apparently expanded the availability of supplemental jurisdiction in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.95 Moore permits fed-

eral courts to entertain a compulsory counterclaim, notwithstanding the
absence of an independent jurisdictional basis.96 Moore did not speak of
a "necessity" for ancillary jurisdiction, but emphasized the close relationship between the plaintiff's claim and the counterclaim. 97 Although an

attentive reading of Moore does not disclose a conscious desire to expand
91. Multiple litigation imposes duplicative costs on society, which must pay for the additional
jurors and court personnel. The party involved not only incurs more expense, but may risk collateral
estoppel from the case that goes to judgment first. See Matasar, supra note 1, at 170.
92. Of course, federal question cases would still be litigated in federal court.
93. See IL PoSNER, supra note 37, at 147-60. Perhaps this fear was greater at the time snpplemental jurisdiction was first recognized than it is today. It is interesting in this connection to compare the Supreme Court's concern in 1844 over the bar's dissatisfaction with the complete diversity
rule of Strawbridge,see Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844), with
the antidiversity sentiment expressed by some of today's leading federal judges, which prevails despite the bar's continued desire for diversity jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
94. See Landes & Posner, supra note 74, at 369 (discussing relationship between power to create precedents and prestige).
95. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
96. Id at 610. The plaintiff's claim was based on federal antitrust laws, id at 602, while the
couuterelaim was based on state law. Id at 603. Because the parties were not of diverse citizenship,
there was no independent basis for jurisdiction over the counterclaim. Ido at 608.
97. Indeed, the relationship between the two claims was so close that the failure of one would
establish the other. Ido at 609-10. The two claims thus fit within the "logical dependence" test later
used by the Supreme Court in Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978) in
discussing the proper circumstances for exercising supplemental jurisdiction. See infra notes 191-98
and accompanying text. Presumably, the Court could have based its decision on necessity, since
failure to assert a compulsory comiterclaim resnlts in loss of the claim by "rule preclusion," which
precludes a party from asserting a claim that could have been asserted, but was not, in a compulsory
joinder device. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 79, at 527.
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the availability of supplemental jurisdiction, 98 commentators and the

lower courts have consistently read the case as opening the door for the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction justified by efficiency or convenience. 99
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated in 1938,100 provided an enormous boost for packaging litigation. The new joinder rules
promoted an inclusive litigative unit based on transactional relationship;
most of the rules permitted joinder of claims that arose from the "same
transaction or occurrence" as the underlying action.10 1
By increasing the possibility that nonfederal claims would be joined
in federal court, these rules heightened the tension between the restrictions on federal jurisdiction and the goal of packaging.10 2 The lower federal courts soon recognized, as the Supreme Court implicitly had in
Freeman, that the efficacy of the joinder rules would be threatened were
an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction required for each
claim joined.10 3 Inspired by Moore, the lower courts reevaluated and ultimately expanded the scope of supplemental jurisdiction to facilitate use
of the Federal Rules. 104
The result was a general. confluence of the tests used for joinder and
98. The relationship between the original and the ancillary claims was so close as to require no
doctrinal expansion. See supra note 94. See also 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MuLLER & E. CooPER, supra
note 15, § 3523, at 94 ("The Supreme Court... gave very little explanation of why the federal court

bad jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim.").
99. See . FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MLLER, supra note I, § 2.14, at 76; C. WRIGHT,
supra note 25, § 9, at 29-30; Champlin, Extension ofFederalSubjectMatter Jurisdiction: The Need
for a FunctionalApproach, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1437, 1450 n.76 (1980). At the very least, Moore
implicitly rejected any notion that supplemental jurisdiction was limited to cases involving claims to
a res in the possession of the federal court.
100. See 308 U.S. 651 (1938) (Federal Rules as originally promulgated by Supreme Court). For
a brief discussion of the profound impact of the Federal Rules on packaging, see Freer, supra note 2,
at 1065-67.
101. The following rules employed the transaction or occurrence test, or one clearly encompassed by it, in prescribing appropriate joinder. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims),
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g) (cross-claims), FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a) (impleader claims; claims by third-party
defendant against plaintiff, claims by plaintiff against third-party defendant), FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c)
(third-party claims in admiralty), FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (permissive partyjoinder), FED. R. Crv. P.
24(a)(2) (intervention of right).
102. See Freer,supra note 2, at 1067-72; Goldberg, The Influence ofProceduralRuleson Federal
Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REv. 395, 416-21 (1976).
103. See Freer, supra note 2, at 1069-70; Goldberg, supra note 102, at 418-19.
104. This expansion raised a possible conflict with Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the Federal Rules "shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States." Professor Goldberg has concluded that Rule 82 is
mandated by neither the Constitution nor the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), but
embodies a self-imposed policy of restraint that does not preclude consideration of procedural
changes in formulating tests for supplementaljurisdiction. See Goldberg, supra note 102, at 432-43.
But see 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 15, § 3523, at 94 (Federal Rules have
not broadened scope of supplemental jurisdiction, but have permitted greater opportunities for its
invocation).
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for supplemental jurisdiction. 10 5 For example, courts came to exercise
ancillary jurisdiction over nonfederal claims that arose from the same
transaction or occurrence as the underlying federal claim, thereby using
the procedural joinder test as the jurisdictional norm.10 6 This confluence
was not surprising, of course, since the joinder rules and supplemental
jurisdiction shared the goals of achieving efficient packaging and avoiding duplicative litigation. 10 7
B.

The Supreme Court'sImprimatur.

The Supreme Court watched this jurisdictional expansion under the
Federal Rules quietly. It made no comment until 1966, when it avidly
embraced the trend in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. os In Gibbs the
Court upheld the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a state law
claim joined to a claim based on federal labor law. 0 9 The case set the
constitutional boundary for supplemental jurisdiction, holding that
nonfederal claims could be heard if they were part of the same "case" as
the jurisdiction-invoking claim. That issue was determined, inter alia," 10
by whether the nonfederal claims and a substantial federal claim properly before the court arose from a "common nucleus of operative
fact."11 1 The Court thus defined the constitutional term "case" in transactional terms; it expressly tied the propriety of supplemental jurisdiction
to the factual commonality between nonfederal and federal claims, just as
105. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER & E. CooPER, supra note 15, § 3523, at 95-96; Freer, supra
note 2, at 1072; Goldberg, supra note 102, at 416.
106. See, eg., Schwab v. Erie L.R.R., 438 F.2d 62, 68-71 (3d Cir. 1971); Dery v. Wyler, 265

F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cr. 1959).
107. See, ag., Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633-34 (3d Cir.
1961) (noting that the tests for joinder of compulsory counterclaims and for supplemental jurisdiction "are the same because Rule 13(a) and the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction are designed to

abolish the same evil, viz., piecemeal litigation in the federal courts").
108. 383 U.S. 715 (I966).
109. Id at 721-29.

110. In addition to the requirement that the federal and nonfederal claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact," Gibbs requires that the federal issue be substantial and that the case

be such that one would normally expect to try the federal and nonfederal claims in a single proceeding. If these conditious are met, then the federal court has power to entertain the entire action,
although certain discretionary factors may justify dismissal of the nonfederal claim. IdL at 726-27.
Some commentators have noted that the language used by the Court suggests that the expectation of
a unified trial and the common nucleus requirement are disjunctive, not conjunctive. See, eg.,
Baker, Toward a Relaxed iew of FederalAncillaryand PendentJurisdiction, 33 U. Prr. L. REv.
759, 764-65 (1972); Matasar, supra note 1, at 123 n.93. Courts have not agreed, however, and have

considered them two separate requirements. See, eg., Ferguson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 443 F. Supp.
1334, 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979). Even as such, however, the factors

rarely have independent significance. See Miller,Ancillary and PendentJurisdiction,26 S. TEx. L.L
1, 3 (1985).
111. Gibbs 383 U.S. at 725.
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the lower courts had done in developing the confluence between the procedural and constitutional standards for joinder. 12
Gibbs did not mandate that supplemental jurisdiction be exercised.
The Court made a sharp distinction between constitutionalpower to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and the circumstances under which that
power ought to be exercised. 1 3 Under Gibbs, the trial judge has broad
discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and should consider "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants,"114 among
other factors, 115 in determining whether to hear a nonfederal claim. Initially, commentators believed that the discretion recognized in Gibbs was
so broad that the case would result in less use of supplemental jurisdiction. 116 In fact, of course, Gibbs has had the opposite effect.11 7
The Gibbs Court failed to mention at all whether Congress had
sanctioned the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, either in that case or
generally. Indeed, in the century since Freeman, the Court had never
addressed any statutory basis for its tremendous extension of supplemental jurisdiction.11 Gibbs was the latest in this expansion, and it, like the
others, purported to address only constitutional power to entertain
nonfederal claims.
112. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
113. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
114. Id.
115. These additional factors include such prudential limitations as "the likelihood of jury confusion in treating divergent legal theories of relief, that would justify separating state and federal
claims for trial." Id.at 727. The Court also indicated that the trial judge has discretion to refuse to
entertain a supplemental claim because of federalism concerns. Id (supplemental jurisdiction
should be rejected where "state issues substantially predominate" as to issues of proof, scope of the
questions raised, or comprehensiveness of the remedy sought). See also Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 559-60 (1985) (discussing discretion under supplemental jurisdiction doctrines).
116. See 3.FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 2.13, at 71-72; C. WRIGHT,
supra note 25, § 19, at 106-07.
117. See 3.FRIEDENTHAL, M. KAN'E & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 2.13, at 71; Shakman, The
New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN.L. REv. 262, 263 (1968). In some measure, this expansion is due to trial courts' failure to invoke the discretionary Gibbs factors to refuse
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 3.FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. M.LER, supra note 1,
§ 2.13, at 72 ("[Mlost courts have exercised their discretion to hear a pendent claim if the [constitutional] power to do so is found to exist; only a few courts have used their discretion to dismiss
pendent claims." (footnotes omitted)).
118. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 19, at 105-06; Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction,77 COLUM. L. REv. 127, 129-35 (1977). Those editions of leading treatises published shortly after Gibbs was decided discuss only the constitutional and discretionary standards,
failing to raise the question of whether Congress had, or even should have, approved supplemental
jurisdiction. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.5 (2d ed. 1977) (no mention of
need for legislative authorization); C. WmGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§§ 9, 19 (2d ed. 1970) (same).
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SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

Tension with the Narrow Interpretationof JurisdictionalGrants:
The Oxymoron of Common Law Subject Matter
Jurisdiction.

Compared with the cases discussed in Part I, Gibbs and its predecessors present a manifest paradox. On the one hand, the Supreme Court
has construed the invocation of jurisdiction so narrowly that cases
clearly within the federal courts' constitutional competence must be
heard in state court.' 19 On the other hand, cases from Freeman to Gibbs
demonstrate great eagerness to bring into federal court claims that do not
meet the statutory requirements for invoking jurisdiction.
This contrast is all the more curious when we consider the perceived
role of Congress. On the one hand, where Congress has provided a statutory basis mirroring the Constitution, the courts have not exercised
power to the constitutional limit. On the other hand, the courts have
extended supplemental jurisdiction to the constitutional limit without
even mentioning a statutory basis.
Commentators have concluded that the supplemental jurisdiction
developed in the cases culminating in Gibbs represented common law
federal subject matter jurisdiction. 120 If one accepts the traditionally
held view, the Constitution requires that Congress prescribe the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.121 Thus common law subject matter
jurisdiction is an oxymoron, and unless we conclude that the courts have
been usurping jurisdictional power unconstitutionally for over a century,122 there must be a statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction.
Yet, as will be seen, Congress has never expressly addressed supplemental jurisdiction under the general jurisdictional statutes.
I.

RECONCILING THE NARROw AND THE BROAD: A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE STATUTORY BASIS OF SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION

I propose that the two lines of authority are not inconsistent, but
represent interpretations of separate portions of the jurisdictional statutes. The cases restricting original access to federal court construe those
parts of the statutes pertaining to jurisdictional basis. In Strawbridge,
119. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

121. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
122. Of course, the charge that a branch of government has been acting unconstitutionally is not
to be made lightly. Nonetheless, such longstanding unconstitutional action can occur. For example,
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court concluded that its almost centurylong adherence to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), had been an unconstitutional usurpation of state power. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
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Chief Justice Marshall expressly limited the statutory phrase prescribing
suit between a "citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen
of another State"; 123 similarly, the Court's limiting interpretations of the
quantum of federal material that must be involved to invoke federal question jurisdiction have been constructions of the statutory requirement
that an action "arise[ ] under" federal law. 124 The supplemental jurisdiction cases, in contrast, interpret a different part of the jurisdictional statutes-the part pertaining to the scope of the "civil action" properly
before the court. Acceptance of this distinction not only renders manifest the Supreme Court's confusion in later supplemental jurisdiction
cases, but also debunks the myth that supplemental jurisdiction constitutes common law subject matter jurisdiction.
A. The Scope of the Civil Action. Rejecting the Oxymoron of
Common Law Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court's consistent failure even to refer to statutory authorization for supplemental jurisdiction does not mean that such authorization
is nonexistent. 25 The entire tortuous exercise of narrowly construing the
statutory language relating to jurisdictional basis was premised on an understanding of the difference between constitutional and statutory grants
of jurisdiction. It is simply unthinkable that the Court would countenance an expansion of jurisdiction by judicial fiat.
A more persuasive explanation for the omission is that no separate
statutory standard for supplemental jurisdiction exists; instead, that standard is the same as the constitutional standard. 26 In Gibbs, the Court
held that the relationship between a state and a federal claim might be so
close as to "permit[] the conclusion that the entire action before the
court comprises but one constitutional 'ease.' "27 So, too, the relationship between the state and federal claim might be so close as to permit
the conclusion that they comprise one statutory "civil action." 128 In123. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (discussing Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11,
I Stat. 73, 78). Although the statute has been changed to apply to actions "between citizens of

different States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1) (1982), it is clear that Strawbridge remains the definitive
interpretation of the statutory language relating to the basis of original diversity jurisdiction. R.
CASAD & P. SIMON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 189 (1984). See also C. WRIGHi, supra note 25, § 24, at 42.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.

125. See infra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
126. This theory explains how the Court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction can be viewed as
constitutional, but it does not explain why the Court has remained silent about the theoretical basis

for the exercise of this jurisdiction. This silence is perplexing. See supra text accompanying notes
120.122.
127. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
128. The diversity and general federal question statutes adopted the term "civil action" as the

unit of litigation in 1940. See Act of Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 117, Pub. L. No. 76-463, 54 Stat. 143, 143.
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stead of representing an unconstitutional judicial grasp of jurisdiction,
the supplemental jurisdiction cases may evince the Court's assumption
that Congress approved of its right to define the scope of a civil action as
well as its definition of that scope as coextensive with the constitutional
129
standard.
It does seem clear that Congress delegated to the judiciary the task
of defining "civil action"; it has never attempted itself to define the term,
and could have expected that courts would be suited for the task. Congress has expressly delegated to the Supreme Court the power to promulgate the Federal Rules, 130 which include, of course, the joinder rules by
which the litigative unit is defined. These rules have always favored a
liberal definition of that unit, 13 1 and Congress has never exercised its statutory right to reject a joinder rule. 132

Both the courts and Congress seem to have recognized Congress's
acquiescence in the federal judiciary's power to define the statutory scope

of "civil action" under the jurisdictional statutes. In amending the diversity and general federal question statutes in 1940 to adopt the term "civil
action," Congress expressly intended to have the statutory language comport with that used by the Supreme Court in the Federal Rules. 133 In
1969, the Court recognized that a Federal Rule could not, consistent
with Rule 82,134 purport to define one of the statutory terms relating to
invocation of diversity jurisdiction. 135 The Court said nothing, however,
As Professor Currie has demonstrated, "[a]Ithough Gibbs did not similarly elaborate the statutory
basis of pendent jurisdiction, the sole conceivable rationale is the same [as for constitutional propriety]." That is, the term "civil action" as used in the federal question statute "embraces state law
claims sufficiently related to the federal" Currie, Pendent Parties,45 U. Cm. L. REv. 753, 754
(1978). Cf Shapiro, supra note 115, at 560 (supplemental jurisdiction "is, at most, implicit in a
legislative grant ofjurisdiction").
From 1875 until 1980, the general federal question statute gave district courts jurisdiction over
"suits of a civil nature" or "civil actions" in which "the matter in dispute exceeds [the statutory
requirement] and aris[es] under [federal law]." See, ag., Act of Mar. 3, 1887, § 1,24 Stat. 552. In
1980, Congress amended the statute for the sole purpose of deleting the amount-in-controversy requirement Act of Dec. 1, 1980, 94 Stat. 2369. The result is a provision lacking separate reference to
subject matter basis and litigative unit, grantingjurisdiction over "civil actions arising under [federal
law]." Congress gave no indication that this amendment was intended to affect supplemental
jurisdiction.
129. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
131. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) provides that Congress has power to reject rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court. See generally C. WRiGHT, supra note 25, § 62, at 402-08 (describing development and history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
133. See supra note 125. Thus Congress expressly adopted the language used by the Supreme
Court in the Federal Rules to define the litigative unit.
134. See supra note 104.
135. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339 (1969).
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that would limit the judiciary's power to define the scope of the litigative
unit.
Thus, both the structure of the jurisdictional statutes (providing for
power over a "civil action" in a phrase separate from the language relating to the jurisdictional basis) and the grant of rulemaking power support
the conclusion that Congress delegated to the federal courts authority to
define the scope of the civil action. Both the transactional test of the
Federal Rules and the Court's failure to mention a separate statutory
standard in Gibbs suggest that the scope of the civil action is coextensive
' 136
with the scope of the constitutional "case.
One can reasonably conclude that Congress has embraced the
Court's equation of the statutory and constitutional standards for the
scope of an action. Congress reenacted the diversity statute137 (and enacted for the first time the general federal question statutel 3 s) after Freeman without any comment on that case's recognition of supplemental
jurisdiction. It reenacted and extended the coverage of both statutes after Moore without any comment on that case.1 39 It again reenacted without comment both statutes after the lower courts' expansion of
supplemental jurisdiction to match the Federal Rules, 140 and it amended
the federal question statute after Gibbs without voicing any displeasure
with that case's liberal statement of supplemental jurisdiction.14 1 Using
the traditional canon of statutory construction invoked in the cases restricting original federal court jurisdiction, 142 Congress's failnre to disapprove of the judiciary's century-long expansion reflects its approval of a
broad statutory view of the proper litigative unit.143
B.

The Resulting Theory.

This recognition of a statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction is
important for purposes of reconciling the two lines of cases; each line
relates to a separate statutory provision embodying different policies.
Keeping these separate bases and policies in mind helps to abate the ten136. See supra text accompaning notes 128-29.

137. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (pt. 3).
138. Id. §§ 2-3, 18 Stat. at 470-71.
139. Act of Apr. 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143.
140. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1 (federal question), § 2 (diversity), 72 Stat.
415,415; Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-439, § I (diversity), 78 Stat. 445,445; Act of Oct. 21,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 2 (federal question), § 3 (diversity), 90 Star. 2891, 2891.
141. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369, 2369-70.

142. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
143. But see supra text accompanying notes 43-44 (noting that the traditional canon may not
reflect any actual congressional intent to adopt the judicial precedent by means of statutory
reenactment).
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sion between the lines. All too often, however, courts misconstrue the
task before them because of a failure to recognize the dual sets of interests involved.
Courts must address the restrictive line of authority first, to determine whether the claims originally stated, and the parties originally
joined, satisfy one of the narrow bases for invoking jurisdiction. If they
do, jurisdiction attaches, because the court has before it, for example, a
144
"matter in controversy... between... citizens of different states."
Then, as a separate, second endeavor, the court may flesh out the proper
scope of the entire civil action surrounding the jurisdiction-invoking
claim. The Federal Rules and the Gibbs test define that scope in terms of
constitutional (and, impliedly, statutory) power and the proper exercise
of discretion. 145
This approach respects the policies underlying the respective lines of
authority and assumes that a federal court acts within its power in defining the scope of the action before it. Thus, each line of authority operates
where it is supposed to: the narrow line restricts invocation of jurisdiction, and the broad line promotes packaging.
This approach ensures that the policies underlying one line do not
harm those supporting the other. For example, a court will not address
supplemental jurisdiction until the restrictive rules for invoking jurisdiction are satisfied. Thus the desire for efficient packaging will not threaten
the restrictions on invocation ofjurisdiction. Similarly, the cases relating
to invocation of jurisdiction have no bearing on supplemental jurisdiction; applying them there would thwart the policies supporting that doctrine. Thus the separate parts of the statutes, and their case law, should
be kept separate. 146
Interestingly, although the federal courts failed to discuss any statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction, their treatment of supplemental
jurisdiction until recently was remarkably consistent with the model I
have set forth. Until the mid-1970's, supplemental jurisdiction had developed neatly. With striking uniformity, the federal courts exercised ju144. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(I) (1982).
145. The implicit statutory adoption of Gibbs, see supra text accompanying note 141, carries

with it that case's discretionary factors, which allow the trial judge to weigh the relative benefits of
packaging against other considerations. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

146. Of course, Congress retains the power to restrict supplementaljurisdiction. But it has never
done so. Indeed, it has legislated regarding supplemental jurisdiction only once. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(b) (1982) (jurisdiction for action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a
substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection, or trademark
laws). Congress does not appear to have addressed the issue expressly or implicitly on any other
occasion. If Congress wants to alter the status quo by rejecting the courts' equation of the statutory
and constitutional standards for supplemental jurisdiction, it should do so by means of express legislation limiting supplemental jurisdiction.
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risdiction over claims satisfying the transaction-based constitutional
test.1 47 They seemed to assume that Congress approved of their actions,
almost implying a presumption in favor of applying the Gibbs test for
supplemental jurisdiction. 48 The result was workable and convenient,
since the procedural propriety of most joinder devices is coextensive with

the constitutional (and implied statutory) test. It was also efficient, facilitating the inclusive packaging of disputes and avoiding multiple
litigation. 14 9
Until the mid-1970's, the lower federal courts disagreed sharply on

the availability of supplemental jurisdiction in only two types of cases:
those involving "pendent parties"' 50 and those involving claims by the
147. Federal courts have for some time routinely exercised supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory couuterclaims, see Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d
Cir. 1961); third-party impleader claims, see Schwab v. Erie L.R.R., 438 F.2d 62, 68-72 (3d Cir.
1971); crosselams, see Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1966); claims of intervention as
of right, see Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 822-25 (5th Cir. 1967); and claims
by a third-party defendant against the original plaiutiff. See Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709,714-16 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, supra note 15, § 3523 (discussing ancillary jurisdiction).
148. Analogously, the Supreme Court did not mention a statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction in any of its opinions from Osborn through Gibbs. See Comment, supra note 118, at 129-40.
It may bc argued that Osborn implicitly resolved the question of statutory authorization; later cases,
however, reject this notion. Idk at 130 n.23.
149. See 1. FRiEDENTRHAL, M. X-Arm & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 6.1, at 313 (efficiency of
packaging); 3A ".MooRE & ".LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 18.02, at 18-6 (2d ed. 1986)
(same).
150. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 19, at 107-08 ("i]he Second Circuit led the way in
holding that pendentjurisdiction would allow taking jurisdiction of a state claim against one party if
it were related closely enough to a federal claim against another party, even though there was no
independentjurisdictional base for thestate claim."). These holdings imply, of course, that the court
need not have an independent basis ofjuisdiction over original claims against each defendant. See,
eg., Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor,
Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1971). Most courts that addressed the
question approved of pendent party jurisdiction. See, ag., Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 846-48
(Ist Cir. 1975); Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1193-97 (5th Cir. 1975); Curtis
v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 519-20 (3d Cir. 1973), cert,. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Schulman v.
Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864, 866-67 (8th Cir. 1973). Commeutators also approved of the coucept.
See, eg., Currie,supra note 128, at 766; Fortune, PendentJurisdiction-theProblem of "Pendenting
Parties," 34 U. Pirr. L. RF-v. 1, 21 (1972).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, has refused to recognize the
doctrine. See, ag., Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert dismissed, 435 U.S.
982 (1978); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd in part,rev'd in part sub nom.
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). These opinions are based on a conclusory statement from Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969), which dealt only with amount in controversy. See Currie,supra note 128, at 754-55.
The Supreme Court finally answered some questions concerning pendent party jurisdiction, at
least in the context of a section 1983 civil rights case, in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See
generally Infra text accompanying notes 157-76.
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plaintiff against a nondiverse third-party defendant.15 1 The split of authority mirrored confusion about how to approach these cases. The
Supreme Court addressed both situations in the 1970's and only compounded the confusion. Because the Court had never recognized a statutory grant of power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction apart from the
language relating to jurisdictional basis, it failed to appreciate the different purposes and policies of the two lines of authority. Like a ship without a rudder, the Court sailed aimlessly, and proceeded on the absurd
conviction that the judiciary could, notwithstanding the absence of legislative consideration of the issue, divine a legislative intent to preclude
supplemental jurisdiction.
IV.

THE 1970's AND THE SUDDEN APPEARANCE
OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT

In the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court addressed two cases involving
the questions of supplemental jurisdiction that had divided the lower
courts. In deciding them, the Court failed to identify a statutory basis
for the principled resolution of supplemental jurisdiction questions, sanctioning instead an ad hoe search for legislative intent that has merely led
to confusion. As I will now show, adopting the principled approach I
propose would resolve the problems and eliminate the confusion.
A.

Pendent Parties.

1. Defining the Task" The PrincipledApproach The typical pendent party case involves the assertion of a federal question claim against
one defendant joined with a closely related state claim against a different,
nondiverse, defendant. 152 As to this second defendant, there is neither
federal question nor diversity jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the close factual
relationship between the two claims might satisfy Gibbs.15 3 To those
courts that reject supplemental jurisdiction in such circumstances, this
151. The majority of the cases held that there was no ancillary jurisdiction over such claims.
See, eg., Kenrose Afg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972). A substantial
minority reached the opposite conclusion. See, ag., Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D.
697 (D. Kan. 1975). The Supreme Court resolved the dispute, at least in the diversity jurisdiction
context, in Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1977). See generally infra text
accompanying notes 183-213.
152. See L FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. Mmmt , supra note 1, § 2.13, at 73 (arguably the
most justifiable application of pendent party jurisdiction is in precisely such situations); see also
Fortune, supra note 150, at 21 (courts should not hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over a state claim
against one defendant that shares a common factual background with a substantial federal claim

against a codefendant).
153. The Gibbs test embodies the implied statutory standard as well as the constitutional limit
for supplemental jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 137-43.
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case represents a crossroads between the two lines of authority discussed
above. To them, the liberality of the supplemental jurisdiction line of
authority threatens at this point to overwhelm the narrow restrictions on
invoking original jurisdiction.
The seriousness of the problem depends on the perspective one takes
when attacking the pendent party problem. One who sees the case as
presenting a supplemental jurisdiction issue would first consider whether
the court's jurisdiction has been invoked by satisfaction of the restrictive
line of authority. Presumably, the federal question as to the first defendant suffices for original jurisdiction, and the remaining question is
whether the joined matter concerning the second defendant satisfies the
procedural rules and Gibbs.
On the other hand, one who sees the case as presenting a problem of
original joinder is troubled by the fact that pendent party jurisdiction
allows the claim against the second defendant into federal court even
though one of the restrictive lines of authority for invoking jurisdiction is
not satisfied. Here, it may be more difficult to conclude that the original
joinder against the pendent defendant is merely part of the process of
fleshing out the scope of the civil action; it can as easily be seen as part of
the process of invoking the court's original jurisdiction.
The unease surrounding pendent parties stems from a failure to appreciate the difference between these two perspectives and to assess critically which one is implicated in the case. The pendent party resultexercising jurisdiction over one against whom no federal claim is asserted-creates a serious problem only if one concludes that there is a
statutory requirement that an independent basis of original jurisdiction
exist over the claims asserted against each defendant.
Whether an independent basis ofjurisdiction over each defendant is
required depends on the statute involved and its requirements for invoking original jurisdiction. The restrictive interpretations of the diversity
statute do require satisfaction of the original basis ofjurisdiction as to all
original defendants. Strawbridge demands that all original plaintiffs be of
diverse citizenship from all original defendants; it thus prohibits a plaintiff from suing a diverse defendant and claiming pendent party jurisdiction over a nondiverse codefendant. 154 The general federal question
154. This interpretation is consistent with Supreme Court precedent in the class action context
denying aggregation and requiring that each member ofa plaintiff class satisfy the statutory amountin-controversy requirement. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973); Snyder
v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969); see also Bratton, PendentJurisdictionin Diversity Cases-Some

Doubts, I1 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 296, 322-23 (1974); Note, FederalPendent PartyJurisdictionand
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs-FederalQuestion andDiversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REv. 194, 231-36
(1976).
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statute, in contrast, does not require an independent basis of jurisdiction
over each original defendant.15 5 This difference stems, of course, from
the character of the jurisdictional basis involved: federal question jurisdiction centers on substance, while diversity jurisdiction centers on
parties.
Accordingly, in a diversity case involving a pendent party problem,
the court would not reach a supplemental jurisdiction inquiry, since the
requirements for invoking jurisdiction would not be satisfied. But where
original jurisdiction is based on the general federal question statute, the
pendent party case will present a supplemental jurisdiction problem, and
the resolution of that problem will depend on whether joinder satisfies
the joinder rules and the Gibbs constitutional (and implied statutory)
standards for supplemental jurisdiction. Because Congress has not addressed the pendent party issue under the general federal question statute, congressional approval of supplemental jurisdiction should be
presumed.
In Aldinger v. Howard,15 6 the Supreme Court faced the pendent
party issue under a specific federal question statute. Unfortunately,
although Congress had not definitively addressed the question of supplemental jurisdiction in the context of that statute, the Court concluded
that the legislature intended to preclude supplemental jurisdiction.
2. Aldinger v. Howard.
a. The presumption. In 4ldinger, the plaintiff asserted a civil
rights claim under section 1983157 against a county official who had discharged her because she allegedly had been living with her boyfriend.
She joined a state law claim against the county itself. The county could
not have been sued under diversity jurisdiction because it and the plaintiff were cocitizens; it could not have been sued under section 1983 because that statute, as then interpreted by the Supreme Court, did not
allow actions against municipalities.158 The Court rejected supplemental
jurisdiction over the county, relying on what the Court felt was the
"clear Congressional intent" of section 1983 that municipalities not be
155. See supra note 150.
156. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
157. 42 U.S.C: § 1983 (1982), which derives from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, seeks

to redress deprivations of constitutional rights. Its jurisdictional statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).(4)
(1982).

158. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961) (city not "person" for purposes ofsection
1983), overruled, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); infra note 166.
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sued in federal court.' 59

The Court expressly limited the holding in Aldinger to the pendent
party situation in a section 1983 case. 16° Nonetheless, the case is important because it expressly recognizes that Congress must authorize supplemental jurisdiction and implicitly rebuts the notion of common law
subject matter jurisdiction. 16 The Court's treatment of congressional
authorization is odd, however. The case implicitly establishes a presumption that supplemental jurisdiction will be available unless Congress
has negated it in some way.' 62
Although the Court's approach seems consistent with my proposal,
there is one glaring difference. The Court seems willing to presume congressional approval of supplemental jurisdiction, but it has never identified the source of that legislative grant. This oversight leads the Court to
overlook the fact that supplemental jurisdiction is part of the statutorily
sanctioned process by which the scope of the civil action is fleshed out.
This will lead, in turn, to a failure to protect the policies underlying supplemental jurisdiction. Before addressing these points, it is worth noting
how ephemeral the Court's presumption is.
b. Rebutting the presumption: seeking what does not exist. The
Court eviscerated its presumption by allowing rebuttal in the absence of
any meaningful indication of congressional disapproval of supplemental
jurisdiction. Section 1983 said nothing about supplemental jurisdiction;
the legislative history was at best inconclusive. 163 In such a case, it is
absurd to ponder a congressional intent to preclude supplemental jurisdiction. Indeed, the conclusion is especially ludicrous in 41dinger because pendent party jurisdiction had not even been recognized when
159. In the majority's view, the legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended to pre-

clude subjecting municipal bodies to suit in federal court on any jurisdictional basis. Aldnger, 427

U.S. at 16-17. This intent constituted implied rejection of supplemental jurisdiction. . at 19.
160. Id at 18.
161. r. at 15-16. The statutory issue bore discussion in .4ldinger because there was a debate
over whether supplemental jurisdiction was allowed under the statute in question. The Court distinguished the Gibbs situation, where the Court could appropriately fashion its own rules of supplemental jurisdiction over nonfederal claims or questions in the face of congressional silence on those
issues, from the Aldinger situation, where Congress had addressed the propriety of jurisdiction over
certain parties, thus leaving the Court less discretion. rd. at 15-16.
162. Id. at 18. See Schenkier, supra note 86, at 257-60; see generally Comment, supra note 118,
at 14042 (1977) (approving the Aldinger rule that jurisdictional statutes should be construed as
granting pendent jurisdiction unless they negate it, but recognizing uncertainty as to what constitutes congressional negation).
163. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 704-804 (1871) (federal court may enforce state
claims against local governments "under the ordinary restrictions as to jurisdiction"). For a detailed
discussion of the legislative history, see Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 23-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
also Currie,The Supreme Courtand Federallurisdiction: 1975 Term, 1976 Sup. Cr. REv. 183, 197
(criticizing conclusion drawn in Aldinger from legislative history as "a glaring non sequitur").
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65

Congress enacted section 1983.164 How, then, could Congress have intended to preclude its use?
By authorizing a search for legislative intent on an issue Congress
never considered, the Aldinger Court invited all feder ! courts to speculate, to hunt for some fictive intent relating to supplemental jurisdiction. 165 Ironically, this practice leaves the ultimate decision not to the
legislature-where it concededly belongs-but to the courts. This is exactly the result the Court ostensibly wanted to avoid. Indeed, Aldinger
should be an especially good lesson about avoiding judicial inquiry into
the nonexistent. Just two years after deciding the case, the Court overruled its earlier interpretation of legislative intent and held municipalities
amenable to suit under section 1983.166
There is a more basic flaw in the Court's treatment of this fictive
legislative intent to preclude supplemental jurisdiction. The Court erred
in looking for congressional intent in the absence of congressional action.
As Professor Mayton and others have shown, the Constitution embodies
a bias against new legislation. 167 The framers purposefully made the pas164. See Comment, supra note 118, at 145-46.
165. See, eg., Kiss v. Tamarac Utils., Inc., 463 F. 5upp. 951, 953-54 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (seeking
evidence of congressional intent regarding pendent party jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Maltais v. Uuited States, 439 F. Supp. 540, 547 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (seeking
evidence of congressional intent regarding pendent party jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims
Act and its jurisdictional statute).
166. In Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), the Court looked
again at the legislative history of section 1983 and concluded that its previous reading of that history
had been erroneous. C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 22A, at 121. Monell held that a municipal body
is a "person" under section 1983, at least insofar as the gravamen of the claim against it is that the
body's implementation of an official policy or custom worked a deprivation of civil rights. Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Aldinger, had based his conclusion that counties
were "persons" on a reading of some of the same portions of legislative history that were later relied
on in MonelL Compare Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 26-29 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting portions of
floor debates on predecessor of section 1983) with Monell, 436 U.. at 680 (relying on the same
debates). But in Aldinger, the Court saw the legislative history relied on by Justice Brennan as
irrelevant to the question of pendent party jurisdiction. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17 n.12. Thus Aldinger provided no clue that such a major shift in the reading of that history might be forthcoming.
These divergent interpretations, within two years of each other, of the legislative history of a statute
more than a century old, suggest the folly of the Court's reliance in Aldinger on the clear legislative
intent of the statute.
167. See Mayton, The PossibilitiesofCollective Choice Arrow's Theorem, Article I, andthe Delegatfon ofLegslative Power to AdministradyeAgencies, 1986 DUKE LJ.948 (Article I imposes decision costs and checks on legislative process in order to restrain instability of the law); see also INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-51 (1983) (framers of the Constitutiou drafted presentment and bicameral requirements with great precision in order to circumscribe congressional power to enact new
legislation); C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTrIU=ONAL LAW 82 (1969)

(Tllhe Constitution provides one way, and one way only-and that is a way hedged with careful
safeguards-for Congress to express the national purpose and will.").
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sage of new laws difficult by requiring majority votes in each House 168
and by providing for presidential veto. 169 The Court's conclusion that
Congress can rule without satisfying those constitutionally imposed requirements-by merely "intending" some result-presumes Congress
has more power than it does.
c. Confusing the narrow and the broad. The Court asserted that
pendent party jurisdiction is, as a general matter, more difficult to sustain
than other forms of supplemental jurisdiction because it involves proceeding against a defendant as to whom no federal claim is asserted 17 0
There is no basis for this general conclusion, which reflects fundamental
confusion of the respective inquiries to be made. It presupposes that the
jurisdictional statutes require an independent basis of jurisdiction as to
each original defendant. As discussed above, however, only the diversity
17 1
statute so requires.
The Court added further confusion by positing a hypothetical example of an appropriate case for pendent party jurisdiction. The Court indicated that it would favor such jurisdiction when the jurisdiction-invoking
claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. In such
a case, the Court implied, it could presume that Congress intended broad
packaging, since otherwise the plaintiff would have to split the case into
17 2
two actions.
But this example is meaningless. First, the Court contradicts itself.
Earlier, it indicated that the relevant statutory inquiry was whether Congress had precluded jurisdiction.17 3 With the example concerning exclusive jurisdiction, however, it approves supplemental jurisdiction because
Congress has affirmatively embraced it. Second, the Court makes the
fundamentally erroneous assumption that congressional intent (even if
discernible and relevant) regarding one statute says anything at all about
how a different statute should be interpreted. Indeed, the mere fact that
Congress has statutorily granted exclusive original jurisdiction regarding
a certain type of case may say nothing about its intent as to supplemeutal
jurisdiction under that statute; it certainly says nothing about congres168. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7. This requirement both "assures that the legislative power [will] be
exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings," Chadha,462 U.S. at
951, and decreases the likelihood that it will be exercised at all. M. IusH & J. PROTHRO, THE
POLITICS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 386 (1959).
169. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. The requirement of a two-thirds vote in the Senate to override
a presidential veto may discourage measures that will inspire significant opposition.
170. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
172. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
173. Id. at 16-17.
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sional intent regarding supplemental jurisdiction under an entirely different statute.
After all, the desire to package efficiently is the same regardless of
whether the jurisdiction-invoking claim is within exclusive federal jurisdiction. And there may be a strong policy interest in having even a
nonexclusive federal question heard in federal court. In Aldinger, for
example, the plaintiff was forced to proceed against the county in state
court. 174 Thus, she either had to (1) split her action between state court
and federal court, (2) assert all claims in state court, thereby abandoning
a federal forum for her federal claim, or (3) proceed in federal court and
abandon the claim against the county altogether. Obviously, she would
have preferred to assert federal rights in a federal forum, especially if she
feared bias in the state courts. And although the legislative history of
section 1983 was debated on some counts,1 75 one thing is clear: Congress
176
wanted these claims heard in federal court if the plaintiff so desired.
Thus, by limiting the packaging presumption to cases involving exclusive
federal jurisdiction, the Court forced the abandonment of important federal claims to state courts.
In sum, Aldinger gives no consistent analysis. It purports to presume congressional approval for supplemental jurisdiction but fails to indicate the source of such grant. Its nervousness over not having an
independent federal claim as to each defendant demonstrates a tendency
to confuse restrictions on original jurisdiction with restrictions on supplemental jurisdiction. Unable to extract itself from this confusion, the
Court attempted to resolve matters by a search for fictive intent.
B. Plaintiff's Claim Against a Nondiverse Third-PartyDefendant
1. The PrincipledResult. The second situation that caused serious disagreement among the lower courts after Gibbs was the assertion of
a claim under Rule 14(a) 177 by a plaintiff against a nondiverse third-party
defendant in a diversity case. There are two prerequisites for bringing
such claims. First, one of the original defendants must implead the third
party; this joinder is proper only if the third party is allegedly liable to
174. This conclusion assumes that Monell bad not been decided before Ms. Aldinger's claim

went to trial. See supra note 166.
175. See supra notes 163, 166.
176. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Dawes); see afso
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-80 (1961) ( [O]ne reason the legislation was passed was to afford
a federal right in federal courts... ."); Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HARV.L.
REV. 1352, 1356-61 (1970) (presenting policy arguments for providing federal forum).
177. F.D. R. Civ. P. 14(a) ("The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant

arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claims against
the third-party plaintiff ... ").
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the defendant for indemnity or contribution relating to the plaintiff's underlying claim. 7 8 Second, the plaintiff's claim against the third party
must "aris[e] from the same transaction or occurrence" as the underlying
action. 7 9 This claim joinder requirement obviously satisfies the Gibbs
test for supplemental jurisdiction. 18 0
Using the principled approach proposed above, the first inquiry is
whether the restrictive statutory interpretation for invocation of original
jurisdiction is satisfied. It will be, of course, if there is complete diversity
between the original plaintiff and the original defendant and the amount
in controversy exceeds $10,000. The second step is to flesh out the scope
of the civil action through the joinder rules and supplemental jurisdiction
in accordance with Gibbs. The plaintiff's claim here is clearly a matter
of subsequent joinder, not original invocation of jurisdiction. It thus
does not implicate Strawbridge,and should be asserted under supplemental jurisdiction, since it satisfies both the Federal Rules and Gibbs. And
because Congress has never satisfactorily addressed the general availability of supplemental jurisdiction either under the diversity statute or with
regard to a Rule 14(a) claim by a plaintiff against a nondiverse thirdparty defendant, there is no basis for inquiring whether Congress has
precluded the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.' 8 '
Nonetheless, the Court concluded in Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger that Congress had intended to preclude supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 14(a) claims by a plaintiff against a nondiverse thirdparty defendant. 182 It did so only through a blatant mischaracterization
of the issue, which allowed it to import into the supplemental jurisdiction
inquiry restrictions that are appropriate only with regard to the invocation of original jurisdiction.

178. Id. The rule provides that any "defending party" may assert a claim against one "not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him."
This impleader claim may be asserted even when state law requires judgment against the defendant

as a prerequisite to a suit for indemnity or contribution. See, eg., Holzhauser v. Container Corp. of
Am., 93 F.R.D. 837, 839 (W.D. Ark. 1982). It is a prerequisite to the plaintiff's assertion of a claim
against the newly joined third-party defendant and the third-party defendant's assertion of a claim
against the plaintiff. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). See generally . FRIBDENTHAL, M. KANB & A.
MILLER, supra note 1, § 6.9, at 360-65; Freer, supra note 2, at 1089-93.

179. See supra note 177.
180. See supra note 153.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 137-45; see also Berth, The Erection ofa BarrierAgainst
Assertion ofAncillary Claims An Examination of Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 1979

ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 253 & n.1 (no statutory prohibition discernible).
182. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978).
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Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.

a. The case

In Kroger, the Court was willing to assume the obvi-

ous fact that a Rule 14(a) claim by a plaintiff against a nondiverse thirdparty defendant satisfies the constitutional test for supplemental jurisdiction.18 3 Nonetheless it rejected-indeed, absolutely precluded-use of
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims.18 4 The holding was entirely
1 85

statutory.

In the Court's view, the plaintiff was attempting to assert state
claims against both diverse and nondiverse parties. If this had been attempted in an original complaint, the joinder would have violated Strawbridge Therefore, a per se rule of dismissal was dictated; the plaintiff
was attempting by indirection what could not be accomplished directly.18 6 This reasoning presents profound confusion regarding the difference between invoking original jurisdiction and using supplemental
jurisdiction to facilitate packaging.
b. Congressionalintent: construing the nonexistent The Court's
treatment of legislative intent in Kroger focuses on a series of irrelevant
factors, such as defendant-initiation and logical dependence, which are to
be weighed in some undefined ad hoc manner in order to ascertain
whether Congress implicitly intended to preclude a particular exercise of
18 7
supplemental jurisdiction.
183. Id. at 371-72 & n.10. The plaintiff in Kroger was a citizen of Iowa; the defendant was a
citizen of Nebraska, and the claim, for wrongful death of the plaintiff's husband, exceeded S10,000,
so the case fell within diversity jurisdiction. The defendant impleaded a third-party defendant,
against whom plaintiff asserted a claim under Rule 14(a). At the time she asserted the claim, it
appeared that she and the third-party defendant were of diverse citizenship; thus there apparently
was no supplemental jurisdiction issue. The court and the parties discovered after trial had commenced, however, that the plaintiff and the third-party defendant were in fact cocitzens, meaning, of
course, that there was no independent basis of jurisdiction over the claim. See infra note 201.
184. The holding was limited to cases in which the underlying claim invokes diversity jurisdiction. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377. See C. Wna
GHr, supra note 25, § 76, at 516-17. Several courts have
subsequently held that supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate over a plaintiff's claim against a
nondiverse third-party defendant when the plaintiff's original claim invokes federal question jurisdiction. See, ag., Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 1979); Dick Meyers Towing Serv.
v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Philipson v.
Long Island R.R., 90 F.R.D. 644, 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); DeMaio v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 489 F.
Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
185. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377. It is interesting, of course, that the "statutory" factor on which
the Court relied-the requirement of complete diversity-was inserted not by Congress but by the
Court's restrictive reading in Strawbridge. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21; see also The
Supreme Court,1977 Term, 92 HARv.L. REv. 57, 248-49 (1978).
186. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373-76.
187. Id at 373-77. See generally Champlin, supra note 99, at 1445 (describingKroger'sdiscussion of congressional intent as "merely an obfuscating device to mask adhoc deedsionmaking and the
lack of any coherent, cohesive or logical policy for determining when to extend jurisdiction to
nonfederal claims").
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Some commentators have suggested other similar factors, arranging
them in some "proper" hierarchy to divine congressional intent. 188 Their
serious discussion of the Court's multifactored guessing game lends unfortunate credence to an unprincipled approach. Arranging judicially
created factors in a judicially perceived hierarchy is not going to help
determine congressional intent regarding an issue that Congress never
addressed. There can be no "congressional intent" in this situation, and
the matter ought to be resolved by the presumption in favor of supplemental jurisdiction.
The Court relied principally on two factors in trying to justify its
"statutory construction" in Kroger. First, the claim was not "logically
dependent" upon resolution of the underlying action. 189 Second, supplemental jurisdiction was being sought by a plaintiff, not by a defensive
party.190 "True" supplemental jurisdiction claims, then, according to the
Court, are logically dependent and are asserted by parties in a defensive
posture. This conclusion represents nothing more than an ephemeral attempt to justify the result of the case.
First, the touchstone of supplemental jurisdiction has always been
factual relatedness, not logical dependence. 191 The Kroger Court discussed the impleader claim as the archetype for ancillary jurisdiction because of its logical dependence. 192 Indeed, impleader claims are logically
dependent: if the plaintiff loses the underlying action, the impleader
claim falls; if the plaintiff wins, the court must address the impleader
claim to see whether the loss will be shifted from the defendant to the
third-party defendant.
But strict insistence upon logical dependence would significantly
narrow supplemental jurisdiction. It would destroy the convenient confluence between the procedural and constitutional tests for joinder and
would result in much wasteful collateral litigation. For example, with
regard to counterclaims, Kroger would require the court first to assess
the counterclaim's factual relatedness to the underlying action for purposes of classifying it as compulsory or permissive, 93 then to determine
whether the logical dependence test is satisfied so that ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised if necessary.
188. See, ag., Matasar, supra note 1, at 168-78.
189. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376.
190. Id.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 83-118.
192. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376.
193. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim arises from "same transaction or occurrence" as underlying claim); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) (permissive counterclaim does not arise from
"same transaction or occurrence" as underlying claim).
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Use of the logical dependence standard would also preclude jurisdiction over several familiar claims for which the propriety of ancillary jurisdiction has never been questioned. The Court obviously realized this;
after discussing the impleader claim as the archetype, it recognized without criticism the universal acceptance of supplemental jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, and claims by and against intervenors of right, 194 none of which are necessarily logically dependent on
the underlying claims. 195 The Court made no effort to reconcile this recognition with its fetish for logical dependence as to the Rule 14(a) claim
196
before it.
Similarly, the fact that the claim in Kroger was not asserted by one
in a defensive posture is of little importance. The Court implies that the
purpose of supplemental jurisdiction is to promote fairness to the defendant; a defendant precluded from asserting his related claims in the pending litigation would be forced to litigate twice, defending in federal court
and pursuing his own claim in state court. The same inconvenience of
course can befall the plaintiff too, but this carries less weight with the
Court, since the plaintiff could have packaged the case efficiently by filing
197
in state court in the first place.
This point overlooks the fact that Congress has expressly prescribed
a federal forum and the fact that the Federal Rules permit the efficient
packaging desired.1 9 8 Moreover, nothing in the diversity statute or in
Strawbridgerequires that all assertions by a plaintiff, whenever joined, be
supported by an independent basis of jurisdiction. Kroger's implicit assertion to the contrary extends Strawbridge improperly.
c. The unjustified expansion of Strawbridge through mischaracterization of the judicialtask. The issue in Kroger was supplemental jurisdiction over a claim joined in accordance with the Federal Rules after the
complaint had been filed and after independent action had been taken by
another party. The real question before the Court, then, was the scope of
194. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 375 n.18.
195. See 13 C. WhiGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 15, § 3523, at 102. The same is

true with respect to the flip side of Kroger, that is, with respect to 14(a) claims by the third-party
defendant against the plaintif. Kroger does not affect ancillary jurisdiction over such claims; such
jurisdiction is generally allowed. See, ag., Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
196. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 185, at 245-46, 252-53 (criticizing emphasis
on logical dependence).
197. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376 (efficiency desired by plaintiff available in state court; majority

recognizes that its rule produces inefficient results).
198. See Matasar,supra note 1, at 170 ("Mhe Court's presumption against jurisdiction in concurrent jurisdiction cases ignores long expressed congressional desire to preserve a true choice between state and federal courts.").
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the "civil action." Rather than adhere to the broad definitions set out in
the Federal Rules and approved in Gibbs, the Court relied on the narrow
interpretations appropriate to the original invocation of federal jurisdiction. Thus, the Court imported the Strawbridgerestrictions on the invocation of jurisdiction into the supplemental jurisdiction sphere.
To the extent that Strawbridgeis a case of importance to supplemental jurisdiction issues, 199 it held that a plaintiff cannot join a claim against
a nondiverse adverse party as an original matter.2 0° Mrs. Kroger did not
do that. Instead, she used an available joinder rule to assert a claim
against a third party whom the defendant had impleaded after commencement of the action.20 1 Jurisdiction had attached by that point; the
civil action was being fleshed out in accordance with the joinder rules
and Gibbs.
Strawbridge has never been applied to preclude supplemental jurisdiction over any claim the plaintiff subsequently asserted against a party
over whom jurisdiction was established. 202 Indeed, after Kroger, a plaintiff remains free to assert several such claims under supplemental jurisdiction. 20 3 Obviously, reading Strawbridge as Kroger apparently did-to
apply to every assertion by the plaintiff-is completely inconsistent with
the Court's longstanding policy,2°4 restated forcefully in 1967,205 of con199. See supra note 157.
200. See Developments in the Law--Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 874, 992-95 (1958); Note, Diversity Requirements in Multi-Party Litigation, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 548, 549 (1958); ef Kroger, 437 U.S. at 380 (White, 3., dissenting) ("[By requiring complete
diversity,] the Court unnecessarily expands the scope of the complete-diversity requirement while
substantially limiting the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.").
201. Technically, Mrs. Kroger had amended her complaint to include the third-party defendant.
But the Court treated the claim against the third-paty defendant as though it had been made under
Rule 14(a). At first, no one perceived a need for supplemental jurisdiction. Until the third day of
trial, everyone apparently assumed that the third-party defendant was a citizen of Nebraska. Thus
on the record, the plaintiff's citizenship was diverse from that of the third-party defendant, meaning,
of course, that the plaintiff could have pursued a claim directly against that party. The plaintiff did
not do so until after impleader by the defendant. Even at that point, there was no jurisdictional
problem, since diversity was still presumed to have existed. At trial it was discovered that the thirdparty defendant's principal place of business (which determined its citizenship) was actually in Iowa.
The confusion stemmed from the fact that the river that forms the border between the two states had
shifted years before, leaving a small "island" of Iowa in Nebraska. In view of this unusual situation,
it is ludicrous to suggest that the plaintiff could have been engaging in the kind of gamesmanship the
Court found so distasteful. See Kroger,437 U.S. at 383 & n.5 (White, 3., dissenting); see also Berch,
supra note 181, at 258-59.
202. See supra note 200.
203. These include claims against intervenors of right and counterclaims against counterclaiming defendants. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).
204. See Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 554-56 (1844) (holding that
Strawbrldge does not require complete diversity between plaintiff and all shareholders of a defendant
corporation).
205. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
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struing Strawbridge narrowly.
The Court erred by treating a joinder issue as a matter of jurisdiction invocation. Its confusion appears to have been caused by its obsessive belief that the plaintiff could have foreseen the joinder of the
nondiverse third-party defendant yet opted not to sue it originally, thinking that she would have a later opportunity to assert her claim through
Rule 14(a),20 6 The foreseeability ofjoinder, however, is absolutely irrelevant to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
d. The irrelevanceofforeseeability. The Court rested its holding
on its perception of congressional intent, setting forth the irrelevant factors discussed above. 20 7 Its concern with the foreseeability of joinder
simply does not reflect congressional intent as to supplemental jurisdiction. Congress has determined that the federal courts' jurisdiction ought
to be divested only when a party "has been improperly or collusively
made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of the court." 20° Because that
statute is not implicated here, it should follow that Congress would not
be concerned with the foreseeability of joinder.
Moreover, there is no such preemption of supplemental jurisdiction
in other joinder situations where joinder of an absentee is at least as foreseeable. 20 9 The plaintiff may choose, for example, to sue only one of two
potential defendants, "knowing" that self interest will force the nondiverse absentee to intervene2 10 and that intervention of right will carry
with it ancillary jurisdiction.211 In such a case, the plaintiff is achieving
indirectly what he could not achieve directly, yet there is no prohibition
of supplemental jurisdiction; indeed, the Court has noted its general ap206. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 374-75.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982). The majority inKrogerconceded that section 1359 was not satisfied. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 374 n.17.
209. With regard to indispensable parties, however, Rule 19 itseIfprecludes supplemental jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). See supra note 90.
210. See Berch, supra note 181, at 258-60; The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 185, at
245.
211. See, eg., Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886), cited with approvalin Kroger,437 U.S. at 375
n.18. Ironically, Kroger promotes and rewards the very "foreseeing of joinder" it purports to criti-

cize. The wily plaintiff simply must await the impleader of the third party and the third party's
assertion of a Rule 14(a) claim against him. Such claims, probably unaffected by Kroger, carry
ancillaryjurisdiction. See Fmkle v. Gulf& W. Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1015, 1018 (3d Cir. 1984); Revere
Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 711-17 (5th Cir. 1970). Then the

plaintiff can assert his claim against the third party as a compulsory counterclaim, which must carry
supplemental jurisdiction. Some courts addressing the issue after Kroger have reached this conclusion. See, eg., Finkle, 744 F.2d at 1019. This development was entirely foreseeable after Kroger.
See Case Note, Ancillary and Pendent Party Turisdiction in the Aftermath of Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 28 DRAMs L. REv. 758, 764 n.48 (1979).
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proval of supplemental jurisdiction over claims by intervenors of right. 2 12
V. THE 1980's AND BEYOND

A.

The Legacy of Confusion.

Aldinger and Kroger are unprincipled decisions; they neither espouse nor implicitly adopt a consistent method for approaching supplemental jurisdiction issues. The federal courts had worked out such a
system in the century before Aldinger and Kroger, although they failed to
indicate expressly the statutory basis for their exercise of jurisdiction.
But a plausible statutory basis exists, and is supported both by the traditional canons of statutory construction and by the longstanding congressional acquiescence regarding the judicial definition of the scope of a civil
3
action.21
Aldinger paid lip service to a presumption consistent with this history and with the principled approach set forth above. But in applying
the presumption, the Court sanctioned unjustified judicial scavenger
hunts into legislative history and blurred the independent lines of authority relating, respectively, to invoking original jurisdiction and to packaging a civil action. In Kroger the blurring became blindness to the
separateness of the lines, with the Court importing into supplemental jurisdiction doctrine the restrictive rules relating to the invocation of original jurisdiction. The cases direct federal judges to divine a legislative
intent that does not exist. Until Congress addresses the point meaningfully, the quest for legislative intent is ludicrous.
The availability of supplemental jurisdiction obviously has an impact on the desirability of invoking federal jurisdiction in the first
place.214 Both Aldinger and Kroger foster inefficiency. For example, the
practical result in Kroger is that the underlying suit and the defendant's
impleader claim against the third-party defendant may be litigated in federal court, while the plaintiff's claim against the same third-party defendant, transactionally related to the other claims, must be pursued in state
court. Two lawsuits are required for what is, transactionally defined, one
dispute. The plaintiff may avoid this expense and duplication only by

abandoning the federal forum and pursuing both claims in state court.2 15

212. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 375 n.18.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 125-43.
214. See Redish, The FederalCourts,JudicialRestraint,and the Importance ofAnalyzing Legal
Doctrine (Book Review), 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1378, 1395-96 (1985) (reviewing R. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985)) (plaintiff who is unable to achieve packaging in

federal court will be tempted to abandon federal forum altogether).
215. Note that this plaintiff has done nothing "wrong," unlike the plaintiff who attempts co]lusive joinder. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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And because the Kroger rule, like that in Aldinger, is a per se prohibition
of supplemental jurisdiction, it leaves the trial courts no discretion to
exercise jurisdiction. 2 16 Thus even in a case where the plaintiff did not
actually foresee joinder of the third-party defendant, and in which a trial
judge might determine that the interest in packaging outweighed any federalism problem, joinder cannot be effected.
Aldinger and Kroger may be explained as efforts to keep state law
claims out of federal court. Aldinger approves of pendent party jurisdiction only where complete joinder cannot be effected in state court. 2 17 In
all cases in which packaging can be realized in state court-even those
involving federal question claims-the plaintiff is offered a strong incentive to go there. Thus the plaintiff who chooses to package his action
efficiently by bringing all related claims in one court must eschew the
federal forum on the federal question claim.
Kroger is a naked antidiversity case. The deliberate refusal to consider it for what it was-a supplemental jurisdiction case-enabled the
Court to expand the application of Strawbridge to order the per se dismissal of claims satisfying Gibbs. In federal question cases, pendent jurisdiction allows a plaintiff to assert nonfederal claims as an original
matter. 218 In diversity cases, however, a plaintiff now caimot append a
subsequent, procedurally proper Rule 14(a) claim against a third-party
defendant as to whom the court already has subject matter and personal
jurisdiction.
There are policy arguments supporting a harsher treatment of supplemental jurisdiction in the diversity context. 2 19 The Court, however,
did not appeal to policy in Aldinger and Kroger. Instead, it based its
holdings on congressional intent. Although the issue may be debatable,
the Court would be hard put to find meaningful congressional indications
that diversity jurisdiction was meant to be treated as the stepchild of
216. See Berch, supra note 181, at 253 ("[The Court in Owen] creates an enclave of issues which
federal courts may be impotent to adjudicate.").
217. See Redish, supra note 214, at 1395 ("Aldinger] was viewed as a means of reducing federal
dockets.").
218. It is fascinating that Gibbs, which upheld pendent jurisdiction where federal question jurisdiction was invoked, suffered all of the defects found important by the Court in Kroger. Specifically,
the joined claim was not logically dependent on the federal claim, the plaintiff achieved by indirection what he could not have done directly, and supplemental jurisdiction was asserted over a claim
by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court,1977 Term, supra note 185, at 247-48. Moreover, the plaintiff
in Gibbscould have achieved efficient packaging of both of his claims in a single action in state court.
Matasar,supra note 1, at 165 & n.301.
219. These policy arguments have been asserted in the ongoing debate concerning retention of
diversity, and need not be repeated in detail here. They include concerns that federaljudges cannot
render precedential opinions as to matters of state law, that diversity constitutes an unseemly intrusion into matters ofstate law, and that the federal courts' workload has become overwhelming. See
supra notes 63-64, 76 and accompanying text.
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federal jurisdiction. 20
Thus this confused brace of cases may ultimately be seen in interestgroup terms as the imposition of agency costs by an overworked federal

bench that is, in some appreciable measure, hostile to diversity jurisdiction.221 Whether the Court is ultimately successful in imposing these
costs depends on how the lower courts apply the cases and, in turn, on

whether the relevant interest group-the organized bar-is so inconvenienced as to seek congressional correction of the precedents.
B.

The Wages of Confusion: Ten Years After.

Because Aldinger and Kroger provided no meaningful guidance on
supplemental jurisdiction issues, it is not surprising that the situation in
the lower courts is perhaps more chaotic now than it was before those
cases were decided.2 22 Although some litigants have urged courts to read

the cases as an invitation to reassess supplemental jurisdiction in other
224
contexts, 223 the cases give no indication of an emerging consensus.
Of course, this is an absurd result. The Court has only spoken twice

in a century on the issue of legislative authorization of supplemental jurisdiction. Instead of broad, meaningftl pronouncements, the Court has
220. Despite continuing clamor from academics and federal judges for abolition of diversity jurisdiction, see supra note 62, Congress has done nothing to indicate disfavor with diversity jurisdiction. It has resisted every attempt to abolish it. See supra text accompanying notes 62-71. It has not
raised the amount in controversy since 1958; adjusted for inflation, that amount is lower today than
it was in 1958. See R. PosER, supra note 37, at 78-79. It has not expanded the grounds on which a
court may dismiss for improper joinder. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982). It continues to make venue
requirements less restrictive in diversity than in general federal question cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1392
(1982). Congress's reaction to the federal court workload problem has been not to reduce the
caseload, but to increase the workforce. See R. POSNER, supra note 37, at 97. This reaction may
result in a sense of loss of prestige for those judges already sitting.
221. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Redish, supra note 214, at 1397-98
("Mhe use of ancillary jurisdiction hs been denied plaintiff exclusively in the context of diversity
cases, a branch of federal jurisdiction not often favored by federal jurists!").
222. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 19, at 109 (Aldinger has not necessarily had a significant
impact on lower courts); Redish, supra note 214, at 1398 (Aldinger's ambiguities have caused "enormous confusion" in the lower federal courts).
223. See,e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 555-56 (9th Cir. 1982).
224. Regarding confusion in the wake of Aldinger, compare Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Otero,
598 F.2d 627, 630-31 (Ist Cir. 1979) (refusing to interpret Aldinger as general bar to exercise of
pendent party jurisdiction and emphasizing that Aldinger holding was expressly limited to its facts)
with Miletich v. Raley's, 593 F. Supp. 124, 125 (D. Nev. 1984) (refusing to engage in statutory
analysis contemplated by Aldinger where judicial precedent controlling in circuit interprets Article
III as prohibiting exercise of pendent party jurisdiction). Regarding confusion in the wake of Kroger, see supra notes 184, 211. The confusion has not been limited to the federal courts; the unprincipled opinions led to different academic assessments oftheir potential impact. Compare Brill, Federal
Rule of CivlProcedure14 andAncillary Jurisdiction,59 NEB. L. REv. 631, 640 (1980) (arguing that
Kroger "will dominate the area of ancillary jurisdiction for some time") with Berch, supra note 181,
at 260-61 (suggesting that Kroger might turn out to be of limited importance).
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provided unprincipled, result-oriented cases that have given the lower
courts no guidance and have, in retrospect, resolved very little beyond
their peculiar facts. The lower courts' reaction clearly bespeaks confusion; it may also indicate a much greater appreciation for packaging than
the Supreme Court seems to have.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Only two conclusions can be drawn with any certainty. First, the
Supreme Court's dalliance with congressional sanction for supplemental
jurisdiction has not provided meaningful guidance. Second, it has not
created such a restriction on access to federal court as to pressure Congress to take remedial action. This latter point does not change the fact,
however, that the federal courts need a principled, consistent manner in
which to approach the statutory authorization of supplemental jurisdiction. I hope that this article has provided one.

